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HEALTH PLANNING FOR DEREGULATION:
IMPLEMENTING THE 1979 AMENDMENTS*
CLARK C. HAVI;HURSTt
Its time was slow in coming, but the idea of deregulation of the health services
industry must now be taken seriously. Although the option of letting market forces
allocate resources to and within the health care industry has had academic support
in the health policy debate for at least ten years,1 until very recently in policy
circles there was a near consensus that the fundamental choice to rely primarily on
regulation had already been made. 2 The only issues recognized on the policy
agenda involved how to make existing regulatory institutions work better and how
best to extend regulation's grip. But the year 1979 changed all that, as the 96th
Congress sharply reversed the trend toward tighter regulatory controls. Not only
did Congress reject the Carter Administration's heavy-handed proposal for hospital
cost containment,3 but it also significantly reduced the jurisdiction and revised the
mandate of state and local health planning and regulatory agencies under the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974." Competition
and consumer preferences were thus reintroduced as viable candidates for a major
role in disciplining the health care sector.
This article- concerns the implementation of Public Law 96-79, the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979. The thesis is
that these amendments, properly understood, make substantial deregulation of the
health services industry a realistic future possibility. After a brief statement of the
nature and purposes of health planning and related regulation, the article sketches
the recent policy developments that led Congress in 1979 to give the original
health planning law a new, deregulatory thrust. After a short exposition of the
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1. See, e.g., Ellwood, Anderson et al., Health Maintehitoe Strateg3". 9 NMhn. Cski. 291 (1971); Feldstein,
A New Approach to National Health Insurance, Pt. IN I RES1 93 (Spring 1971): Havighurst, Health
Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 Ls.\s & Co i Siw. PRnor. 716 (1970):
Newhouse & Tas lor, How Shall We Pay Jot Hospital Care?. Pt ii. INiR insi 78 (Spring 1971).
2. Cf. Weiner, Governimental Regulation of Health Care: 4 Re.sponse to Sooe Criticisoins Voiced bv Proporenrts
of a "Free larket," 4 Ast. J. L. & kIED. 15 (1978): Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation: Dilenra of a
Partially Developed Public Policy, 57 N.C. L. REV . 1165. 1167 (1979).
3. Debate on H.R. 2626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 C,N;. Rinc. H10,809 (dails ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
4. National Health Planning and Resources Development Amendmens of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79,
93 Stat. 592 [amending the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (Titles
XV and XVI of the Public Health Service Act), Pub. L. No. 93-64 1. 88 Stat. 2225: 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k et
seq. (1976 & Supp. II 1978)] [Hereinafter Pub. L. Nor. 96-79 will be cited as Planning Amendments of
1979].
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amendments' reintroduction of competition as a desideratum in health sector
regulation, the article examines, in some depth, the ways in which health system
planner-regulators must now think about the industry they oversee and must
address their regulatory and nonregulatory responsibilities. Their new assignment
under the 1979 amendments is, first, to appraise the market's ability to function in
allocating particular health services and resources and, second, to "give priority" to
the idea of allowing market forces to operate with respect to those specific services
that can reasonably be expected to respond to consumer preferences, including
cost concerns. Whether the health care system's planning and regulatory compo-
nents will carry out this new mandate in the right spirit and whether regulation
will be gradually displaced by market forces remains to be seen, of course, but
there should be no question that Congress has declared a rather clear preference
in these regards.
Without appreciable experience in analyzing the potential value of competition
and private incentives as controls on system development, the health care industry's
planner-regulators are necessarily approaching their new responsibilities with great
uncertainty and few tools. This article is a tentative attempt 6 to get them thinking
in a balanced way about some highly complex matters and to encourage them to
take an active part in what might turn out to be a particularly exciting and
promising deregulatory endeavor.
I
EBB AND FLOW IN THE REGULATION-COMPETITION DEBATE
A. The Heyday of Health Planning and Regulation
Health planning was coupled with regulation in the 1960s and the early 1970s
in an effort to deal with what appeared to be inappropriate proliferation of
hospital and other institutional health services. 7 Previously, planning agencies had
developed at the local level to serve a variety of different functions, including the
establishment of priorities in the use of philanthropic and governmental funds and
the allocation of service and geographic markets among hospitals anxious to
minimize competition. 8 In due course, however, the dominant concerns of health
planning became less and less the allocation of limited resources to their best uses
and the curbing of competition both for those limited funds and for price-sensitive
customers. Increasingly, with the growth of health insurance and public financing,
the perceived challenge was how to limit the system's exploitation of open-ended
financing sources and how to curb emerging nonprice competition, which was
6. A fuller version of the analysis undertaken by this article will appear in C. HAVIGHURST,
COMPETITION IN A REGULATED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (forthcoming).
7. For overviews of health planning and certificate-of-need regulation, see REGULATING HEALTH
FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON HEALTH PLANNING, CERTIFICATES OF NEED,
AND MARKET ENTRY (C. Havighurst ed. 1974); Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services
by "Certificate of Need," 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973).
8. See Gottlieb, A Brief History of Health Planning in the United States, in REG;ULATING HEALTH FACIIIIES
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 7.
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driving the system to incur unjustified costs. The health planning system offered
itself as a vehicle suitable for rationalizing the health system's development in these
respects and gained increasing federal support throughout the 1960s. Decisions by
planning agencies were gradually seen to require "teeth" to make them effective in
the face of voluntary noncompliance, and state "certificate-of-need" laws began to
appear, giving state authorities the regulatory power to act, usually with local
planners' advice, to prevent undesired growth.'
Early federal support for the health planning enterprise and other localized
health programs was reexamined in the early 1970s. The result of this reexamina-
tion was the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.
That law restructured the planning effort by establishing, largely at federal
expense, a system of 200-plus local health systems agencies (HSAs) that were to
perform a variety of functions aimed at defining community needs and seeing that
they were met. The law required that every state adopt in due course a certificate-of-
need law empowering the local planners and state regulators, acting cooperatively,
to prohibit unapproved proliferation of facilities and institutional services. The
law's thrust was clearly toward centralizing at the local level the significant decisions
on capital investments and service offerings. The Senate committee report on the
new law, in a much quoted statement which seems to have been intended as a coup
de grace aimed at advocates of competition in health services, declared the commit-
tee's view that "the health care industry does not respond to classic- marketplace
forces."' 0
The central-planning orientation was clearly dominant in those days. Even the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (HMO),"' which encouraged the
development of an innovative and highly procompetitive form of health care
delivery, was adopted without appreciable reference to the possible value of
competition. Availability of the HMO alternative was encouraged, through subsi-
dies and otherwise, to promote pluralism-that is, choice among different delivery
modes-than to stimulate economic competition among health care prepayment
plans at one level and among health care providers at another. 12 Again the
Congressional committees and their staffs seemed determined to write legislative
history that gave no comfort to competition advocates. 13
9. For a summary of these developments, see Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by
"Certificate of Need," supra note 7, at 1148-55.
10. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoN;. & An. NEws 7878.
11. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (as amended), 42 U.S.C. §§ 30 0 e et seq. (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978).
12. Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health Maintenance
Organizations: Are They Compatible? 1975 UTAH L. REV. 381, 383-87. For example, under the HMO Act's
"dual choice" requirement, an employer with more than twenty-five employees and a health benefits
plan must offer those employees the option of joining a federally qualified HMO. If both a group
practice model HMO and an individual practice association (IPA) model HMO are available, the
employer must offer an HMO of each type. 42 U.S.C. § 300 e-9 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Thus, a
second group practice HMO or a second IPA-HMO has no right to be offered; and HMOs not meeting
all of the demanding federal requirements are no better off than they would be without the law. Yet
meaningful competition cannot be assured by the existence of two, or even three, competitors. See
Enthoven, Competition of Alternative Health Care Delivey Systems in U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COM-
PETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE322,337-44(W. Greenberged. 1978).
13. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGAN-
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The dominant item on the health policy agenda throughout most of the 1970s
was the need to create an infrastructure of cost-containment regulation that would
permit the expansion of federally run or federally mandated financing programs
and realization of the long-deferred promise of "national health insurance." In this
context, reinvigoration of the private market for health insurance (or other
prepayment plans) and health services was neglected as a policy objective. Indeed,
to many governmental observers and advocates of governmental solutions, the
private sector's failure was perceived more as an opportunity to be exploited than
as a problem to be solved. Few observers in Washington in the mid-1970s would
have acknowledged even a faint possibility that government's regulatory power
over health services would do anything but increase.
B. The Pendulum Swings Back
Several developments helped to trigger the policy re-evaluation that culminated
in the significant policy shift that began to take tangible form in 1979. First, health
care costs continued to escalate throughout the 1970s. 14 Had the rate of increase of
health costs in an inflationary economy simply levelled off and become a stable
share of both the gross national product and federal expenditures, political
concern over the level of spending and the system's fundamental soundness would
have evaporated-even if the system was in fact absorbing vast resources that
could have been put to better uses elsewhere. In other words, even a serious
misallocation of resources would not, in itself, have been enough to sustain
Congressional attention to the industry's basic problems. Regulation, in order to
secure its victory in the policy debate, would have had to succeed only in
permanently levelling off the relative rate of growth, at any point attained during
the entire period. If it had achieved that seemingly easy objective, regulation would
never have been called to account for any departure, no matter how great, from
the social optimum, either in total expenditures or in the way health funds are in
fact employed in the system.
Besides regulation's failure to contain costs at the macro level, its failures at the
micro level also contributed to reopening the health policy debate. Not only did sev-
eral studies of health sector regulation in general and of certificate-of-need regu-
lation in particular indicate substantial ineffectiveness, 15 but it was also increasingly
IZATIONS: TOWARD A FAIR MARKET TEST 83-98 (1974); Hearings on Competition in the Health Services
Market Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 1078-82 (1974) (Statement of Clark C. Havighurst); Starr, The Undelivered Health System,
PuB. INTEREST 66 (Winter 1976).
14. For relevant data on past increases in health care expenditures and projections of future
increases, see Freeland, Calat & Schendler, Projections of National Health Expeiditures. 1980, 1985. and
1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1 (Winter 1980).
15. See, e.g., SALKEVER & BICE, HOSPITAL CERTIFICATI E-OF-NE-I CONTROI.S (1979): Sloan & Steinwald,
Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Use, 23 .1. L. & E(:ON. 81 (1980): (;insburg. Impact of the
Economic Stabilization Program on Hospitals, in HOSPITAl COST CONTAINMENT 293 (M. Zubkoff, I. Raskin,
& R. Hanft eds. 1978); Policy Analysis, Inc., Evaluation of the Effects of Certificate of Need Programs
(forthcoming). But see Sloan, Regulation and the Rising Cost of Hospital Care (1980) (unpublished
paper suggesting that certificate of need programs have no effect, but well-established prospective
reimbursement programs do lower hospital costs).
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perceived that it might be unrealistic to expect regulation, at least as currently
constituted, to perform the cost-containment job.' For one thing, the incentives for
effective cost containment by local agencies were weak because, where the benefits
of added spending would be enjoyed by local providers and patients, much of the
savings from foregoing those benefits would accrue in the first instance to govern-
ment programs and health insurers and ultimately to taxpayers and premium
payers located outside the area. Moreover, HSAs and certificate-of-need agencies
were not comfortable in their role as naysayers, finding it hard to deny arguable
health benefits to patients and to contest providers' claims concerning the contribu-
tions that new investments would make to better "quality" and to meeting patients'
"needs." It is easy to appreciate why politically exposed regulators might be unable
to address quality/cost trade-offs when the analysis requires putting at least implicit
finite values on the health status and life chances of citizens.
Despite these disincentives to impose stringent limits, certificate-of-need pro-
grams might still have been expected to control the growth of the supply of excess
hospital beds since, almost by definition, unused or duplicative facilities have no
apparent implications for individuals' health. According to a prominent study by
Salkever and Bice, the bed complement was indeed controlled somewhat by
certificate-of-need controls. 17 But that study also indicated that certification-of-need
had no significant effect on aggregate hospital investment, since capital investment
per bed rose to offset the savings from preventing the creation of new beds. 18 A
more recent study by Policy Analysis, Inc., covering a longer time period and
testing the possibility that regulatory programs with particular characteristics might
have greater success, has also found no important contribution to overall cost
containment by certificate-of-need programs.' ' Other forms of regulation have also
not been shown to make appreciable differences in overall costs. 21 While it cannot
yet be said that regulation is totally discredited, Congress has been unable to
conclude that the programs it has put in place are anywhere near being sufficient
unto the need.
One particular confession of regulatory failure contributed directly to Congress'
apparent reexamination in 1979 of its health policy premises. The Carter Adminis-
tration's hospital cost containment bill, first introduced in 19 7 7 ,2 1 confronted
Congress with a new type of regulatory control that, while promising somewhat
greater effectiveness in cost containment, carried with i't implications that were
more troublesome than those of earlier regulatory programs. In seeking to impose
a flat percentage limit on the growth of each hospital's revenue, the bill took an
16. Cf. Havighurst, Health Care Cost-Cotaiimiient Regulation: Prospects and a(i Alternative, 3 A.\I. J. L. &
MED. 309 (1979).
17. SALKEVER & BICE, supra note 15, at 51.
18. Id.
19. Policy Analysis, Inc., supra note 15.
20. Sloan & Steinwald, supra note 15 (measuring the impact of controls on expansion of facilities and
services, controls on allowable revenue and/or cost increases, and controls on utilization of hospital
services). But see Sloan, supra note 15.
21. S. 1391, H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 570. H.R. 2626. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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arbitrary approach to cost containment. Although the bill was amended in an
attempt to mute that particular criticism by vesting added discretionary powers in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health
and Human Services, or DHHS), the proposal's percentage limits would have
affected efficient and inefficient hospitals alike, with the result that greater prob-
lems would be created for those hospitals that had already streamlined their
operations; likewise, the percentage formula would have allowed expenditures in
have-not areas, with a lower base, to grow in smaller increments than expenditures
in high-cost areas, widening rather than narrowing the gaps in accessibility to high
quality and advanced technology.
While regulatory arbitrariness such as appeared in the Administration's bill can
be defended as a way of avoiding the necessity for addressing difficult trade-offs
and contesting provider claims, 22 Congress was troubled by the seeming departure
from regulation designed to maintain sensitivity to local needs in favor of an
insensitive federal formula. Having been given this powerful demonstration that
regulation must be arbitrary if it is to be effective, Congress recoiled and defeated
the Administration bill in 1979. While the proposal may still not dead, there is no
question that Congress was stimulated by the glimpse it provided of the future
under regulation to reconsider whether regulation is in fact the most appropriate
strategy. Several of the Congressional leaders in the House's defeat of the Adminis-
tration proposal have begun actively to pursue the alternative of restoring market
forces to a useful role in making the necessary choices.
23
Yet another development contributing to policymakers' new awareness of com-
petition as a strategy for controlling health care costs is the Federal Trade
Commission's recent antitrust enforcement effort in the industry. 24 Following the
Supreme Court's 1975 decision that the so-called "learned professions" are not
exempt from the antitrust laws, 2 5 the Commission began looking at the medical
care sector and commenced a series of investigations into possible antitrust viola-
tions. Approaching the industry with the premises of antitrust enforcers, the
Commission's staff raised questions and considered issues that had long been
neglected in health policy debates. The Commission's efforts were perceived to be
inconsistent with prevailing policies and assumptions, giving rise to the question of
which approach was the appropriate one. The Commission began to be perceived
as a consumer-oriented advocate of competition in health services within the
federal government, where competition had previously lacked supporters of any
kind.26 In this way, the Commission succeeded in reopening questions that had
previously been regarded as closed and in giving practical, rather than merely
22. Havighurst, supra note 16.
23. See, e.g., H.R. 7527 (Reps. Richard Gephardt and Dave Stockman) and H.R. 7528 (Rep. James
Jones), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 3943 (Rep. James Jones) 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
24. See generally, Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services Industry: What Does It All
Mean? 58 MILBANK MEM. FUND. Q. 89 (1980); Havighurst, The Antitrust Laws, the Federal Trade
Commission, and Cost Containment, 56 BULL. N. Y. AllAD. MED. 169 (1980).
25. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 733 (1975).
26. See Iglehart, Adding a Dose of Competition to the Health Care Industry, 10 NAT'i. J. 1602 (1978).
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academic, significance to the debate over the choice between regulation and
competition.
Still another factor contributing to the awakening of interest in adopting a
competition strategy in the health services industry was the work of able advocates
working outside of government. In particular, Professor Alain Enthoven of the
Stanford University Graduate School of Business proposed a "Consumer-Choice
Health Plan," a scheme for national health insurance based on competitive princi-
ples. 27 At the same time, Dr. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., of InterStudy in Minneapolis,
and his colleague, Walter McClure, continued their work on behalf of HMOs, and
the HMO movement began to be viewed as having competitive vitality. This new
view of HMOs as something more than a contribution to pluralism was encouraged
by a study by the FTC's Bureau of Economics, which called attention to the
potential of HMOs to stimulate competitive responses on the part of the larger
delivery system and held out the prospect for effective cost containment stimulated
by competitive forces. 2 8 Moreover, the efforts of Ellwood and McClure in the
Minneapolis-St.Paul area produced a proliferation of' HMOs that seemed to lend
competitive vigor to the market that had not been seen in the health services
industry. 29 Other markets began to show similar promise of becoming competi-
tive,3 ° and it was no longer necessary for advocates of competition to make
exclusively theoretical claims. Congress began to pay attention.
While the foregoing developments served to strengthen Congressional interest
in competition's promise as an organizing and allocating tool in the health services
market, the changing national mood regarding regulation in general was a neces-
sary condition for the shift in policy that appears to have occurred. Increasing
dissatisfaction with government in all its aspects and the rampant inflation in the
1970s have induced unprecedented attention to the high costs that regulation
appears to impose on consumers, and significant deregulation efforts have begun
in a number of regulated industries. 1 Shifts in governmental philosophy and new
evidence of regulation's shortcomings have apparently made it no longer as true as
it once was that Congress thinks reflexively in terms of expanding regulation
wherever some economic problem is encountered. A definitive indication of Con-
gress' new attitude is its resolution of' its inconsistency, throughout most of the
1970s, in expanding regulation of the health care system while simultaneusly
moving to cut back similar regulation in other industries. It was perhaps inevitable
that the increasing doubts about regulation in general would eventually spill over
27. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (pts. I & 2). 298 NEW ENG. J. MII). 650. 709 (1978). See
also A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980).
28. U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZA-TION
AND ITS EFFECTS ON COMPETITION (staff report prepared by L. Goldberg and W. Greenberg) (1977).
29. See Christianson and McClure, Competition in the Delivery of Medical (are. 301 NEw ENG..1. MED.
812 (1979); Iglehart, HMOs Are Alive and Well in the Twin Cities Region, 10 NAT'.. J. 1160 (1978).
30. The Hawaii and Portland, Oregon markets are also reasonably competitive. A. ENIIOVEN, HtAHI!T
PLAN 82-89 (1980).
31. E.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-504. 92 Stat. 1705: Motor Carrier Act of'
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296 (uly I, 1980); 94 Stai. 793: Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94
Stat. 1895.
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into Congressional thinking about problems of health policy, but the fact that the
health policy debate has finally been brought into tune with the larger deregulation
movement is a reassuring sign that Congress knows what it is doing.
1I
THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF 1979:
THE HEALTH PLANNING AMENDMENTS (PUBLIC LAW 96-79)
The original health planning legislation included no language that could plausi-
bly be construed as charging the health system planner-regulators to consider
competition as a factor in their regulatory decisions on certification-of-need. In-
deed, the law appeared to be premised on the belief, then prevalent in both
planning and policymaking circles, that competition could not make a positive
contribution to consumer welfare, the achievement of which necessitates a balanc-
ing of competing concerns for cost containment, quality assurance and enhancement,
and the accessibility of care. To the extent that competition was recognized by
health planners at all, it was seen only as a pernicious contributor to cost escalation,
since the nonprice competition among physicians and hospitals that the financing
system facilitated was perceived to cause costs to rise without regard to the
magnitude of marginal benefits. 2 Although there was nothing in the law that
positively precluded regulators from granting certificates-of-need-that is, allowing
entry into the market-on the ground that the resulting competition would have
desirable effects, neither did the law do anything to encourage the adoption of
such a regulatory approach.
A. Recognizing the Role of Incentives and the
Potential for Change in Financing Mechanisms
The 1979 amendments substantially alter the planner-regulators' mandate with
respect to competition. Where previously competition was not mentioned in the
law, Congress has now included some extensive findings concerning competition's
possible role and made it clear that competition is to be employed wherever it can
serve constructive purposes. Most important, the statute and the legislative history
reveal a Congressional expectation that competition can indeed, under some
market conditions, be useful in achieving the goal of consumer welfare. A striking
illustration of Congress' revised view of competition is the Senate committee's
revision of the language quoted earlier from its 1974 report. Previously, the
committee had expressed the view that "the health care industry does not respond
to classic marketplace forces." It now says that the industry "has not to date
responded" to such forces.33 The key message in the 1979 amendments is that
32. For a discussion of various models of hospital behavior and their effect on quality and cost, see P.
FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 186-216 (1979). The models discussed therein are more complex than
those employed explicitly or implicitly by health planners, yet the most plausible do suggest "a bias
toward higher 'quality,' meaning more facilities and services, greater capital intensity, and a tendency to
introduce new technology before its benefits have been fully evaluated." Id. at 196.
33. Compare S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 10, at 7878 with S. REp. No. 96, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 52
(1979).
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Congress considers it possible that market forces may be able to do in the future
what they have not done in the past and that regulators and planners have a duty
to be alert to those possibilities.
The depth of Congress's insight into the possibilities of competition is revealed
by the fact that the language endorsing competition was introduced in the same
amendments that also substantially removed HMOs from the planner-regulators'
jurisdiction. Whereas the original health planning legislation had specifically re-
quired the states to subject HMOs to extensive certificate-of-need requirements, 3 4 the
1979 amendments undertook, in a dramatic reversal, to prohibit such coverage.
This change reflected a belief that, because consumer cost-consciousness in selecting
an HMO in a competitive setting transmitted cost-consciousness to the HMO itself,
its investment decisions did not have to be second-guessed. :' -' As important as the
recognition of this incentive principle is in the HMO context, it is )erhaps more
important that Congress, in insisting that regulators give weight to competition in
carrying out their remaining regulatory responsibilities, recognized the principle's
more general applicability. Thus, Congress refuted the common misconception that
competition in health services is exclusively a matter of encouraging HMO devel-
opment.
In telling the regulators to be alert to the possibility that the market ma'
function usefully in any service, not only those provided by HMOs, Congress was
not oblivious to the costly demand distortions that third-party payment can intro-
duce. On the contrary, Congress asked the regulators to 1be acutely aware of the
incentives at work. Thus, the House Committee stated that regulatory intervention
might be curbed "if ... an innovative financing, reimbursement or service delivery
arrangement . . . were designed so that the method of' payment by patients (1)
created incentives for patients to respond to prices charged and (2) placed the
providers at financial risk for unnecessary or excessive services. : '" In this way, the
potential for significant, incentive-altering change in the financing system, the root
of the industry's current ability to incur unwarranted costs, was recognized as the
key to reintroducing market forces into the health services industry. Congress
seemed clearly to understand that innovation permitting deregulation would not
necessarily be confined to HMO development.
B. The Amendments' Procompetition Language
Section 1502(b) of the Public Health Service Act, as added by the 1979
amendments,3 7 states Congress' current view of competition's role in allocating
health care resources:
(b) (1) The Congress finds that the effect of competition on decisions of
providers respecting the supply of health services and facilities is diminished. The
primary source of the lessening of such effect is the prevailing methods of paying
34. Public Health Service Act §§ 1523(a)(4)(B) (requiring states to regulate "insiitutional health
services") and 1531(5) (defining "institutional health services" to include HMOs), 42 U.S.C, §§ 300m-2
(a)(4)(B) and 300n(5) (1976).
35. H.R. REP. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1979).
36. Id. at 53-54.
37. Planning Amendments of 1979 § 103(b) [adding § 1502(b) of the Public Health Service Act].
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for health services by public and private health insurers, particularly for inpatient
health services and other institutional health services. As a result, there is duplica-
tion and excess supply of certain health services and facilities, particularly in the
case of inpatient health services.
(2) For health services, such as inpatient health services and other institutional
health services, for which competition does not or will not appropriately allocate
supply consistent with health systems plans and State health plans, health systems
agencies and State health planning and development agencies should in the exercise
of their functions under this title take actions (where appropriate to advance the
purposes of quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and access and the other purposes
of this title) to allocate the supply of such services.
(3) For the health services for which competition appropriately allocates supply
consistent with health systems plans and State health plans, health systems agencies
and State health planning and development agencies should in the performance of
their functions under this title give priority (where appropriate to advance the
purposes of quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and access) to actions which would
strengthen the effect of competition on the supply of such services.
The message of these findings is that health services should be divided by the
planner-regulators into two categories-those "for which competition does not or
will not appropriately allocate supply" and those for which competition is or may
become a reliable allocative mechanism. As to resources used in rendering services
in the former category, command-and-control regulation should be employed to
determine the appropriateness of new investment. As to services that respond to
market forces, a more laissez-faire attitude is indicated.. Thus, it is no longer
appropriate for regulators to assume that command-and-control intervention is
required with respect to all services over which they have jurisdiction. Instead, a
threshold determination is required concerning the market's efficacy, and an
explicit finding of market failure is nearly a prerequisite for substituting the
regulators' judgment for that of the marketplace. Moreover, in noting the significance
of "prevailing methods of paying for health services" in determining the need for
regulation, section 1502(b) signals the regulators that, in view of the possibilities for
change in the financing system, they should not assume that what needs regulation
today will necessarily require their regulatory services in the future.
Other provisions in the amendments reveal Congress' preference for competi-
tion. To the Act's lengthy list of "national health priorities," which previously
lacked even an oblique reference to competition, the amendments add a new
desideratum: "The strengthening of competitive forces in the health services
industry wherever competition and consumer choice can constructively serve, in
accordance with [section 1502(b)], to advance the purposes of' quality assurance,
cost effectiveness and access."1 8 In a less hortatory and more substantive vein, the
amendments assign to HSAs the new function of "preserving and improving, in
accordance with section 1502(b), competition in the health service area.""
Finally, the amendments introduce two new criteria that certificate-of-need agencies
are expected to employ in their decision making. First, they are to weigh, "in ac-
cordance with section 1502(b), the factors which affect the effect of competition
38. Id. § 103(a) [amending § 1502(a) of the Public Health Service Act].
39. Id. § 103(c) [amending § 1513(a) of the Public Health Service Act].
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on the supply of health services being reviewed.""' Second, making explicit the
need to focus on developments on the demand side of the market in establishing
regulatory policies on the supply side, the amendments also require regulators to
consider "improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of health
services which foster competition, in accordance with section 1502(b), and serve to
promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness."'' These new criteria confirm
that, before embarking on command-and-control regulation in a particular case,
health system regulators must address the threshold issue of whether a market
failure exists.
C. Competition and State and Local Health Plans
Health planning and certification-of-need are interrelated by the expectation
that decisions on certificate-of-need applications will be made with reference to the
quantitative specifications of resource needs that are contained in the state and
local health plans which the agencies are required by law to promulgate. The 1979
amendments require that these plans be more quantitative than in the past' 2 and
also introduce the definitive requirement that decisions on certificate-of-need
applications shall be "consistent with the state health plan.'" It may appear that
the law, by insisting on quantitative health plans, implies that central planning is
preferable to competition and is thus internally inconsistent in simultaneously
insisting that competition be highly valued.
It would be possible to minimize the practical significance of the 1979 amend-
ments' procompetition language by calling attention to the fact that section 1502(b)
frames the crucial question as being whether "competition appropriately allocates
supply [of the service in question] consistent with health sYstems plans and State health
plans."'4 4 One could argue that such plans, which, as just noted, the amendments
require to be specific and quantitative, are the ultimate reference point for
assessing competition's efficacy and that Congress intended that competition should
be used only if it was deemed the best wvay to achieve a particular numerical goal.
This would be an extraordinary reading, of course, since competition as an
allocative device is a process for discovering and giving effect to consumers'
preferences, not for hitting predetermined targets. The allocation of resources
resulting from a smoothly functioning market, like the results of the politically
accountable system of health p3lanning-cum-regulation, is notrmally regarded as
legitimized by the democratic character of the choosing process itself.
Although regulation and competition can be complementary in many respects,
the dominant theme in the health planning amendments and their legislative
history is that they are essentially alternative allocative devices whose relative utility
varies with the circumstances. This is perhaps the best reason why the results of
40. Id. § 10 3(c) [amending § 1532(c) of the Public Health Service Act].
41. Id.
42. Id. § 115(d) [amending § 1513(b)(2) to the Public Health Service Act].
43. Id. § 117(a) [adding § 1527(a)(5) to the Public Health Service Act].
44. Id. § 103(b) [adding § 1502(b)(2) to the Public Health Service Act] (emphasis added).
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relying on consumer choice should not be judged by their correlation with the
planners' preferences. Congress has also made clear, however, that its preference
for competition should be accommodated with careful health planning in a differ-
ent fashion. Thus, the House committee report addressed specifically the anticipat-
ed content of state and local health plans insofar as they deal with services that are
deemed by the planners to be allocable by market forces:
[T]he goals of the plan and the statement in those plans of changes in resources
which are needed in the area . . .might differ depending upon the agency's
assessment of the extent to which, for a particular service. competition will limit the
development of unneeded capacity and protect the public from its costs. For
instance, plans could avoid establishing numerical goals or resource requirements
by identifying where certain types of services are needed, or appear excessive, or by
establishing a range for the number of new services needed.):
What Congress intended was that health planners would affirmatively plan for
competition, and for possible deregulation, by including in the plans, wherever
feasible, explicit findings covering the market's efficacy for controlling the supply
of specific services. The regulatory model adopted, while leaving the planners in
charge and enhancing the authoritativeness of their plans, also gave them a new
mandate to allow competitive forces to determine suplplv wherever, in their
judgment as unbiased planners, competition would more accurately reveal consum-
ers' preferences and would not unduly jeopardize other goals judged more impor-
tant than the goals that competition serves. Where the planners find the market
likely to be serviceable in these terms, the regulators are instructed to refrain from
command-and-control regulation of procompetitive new investment and market
entry.
D. Judicial Review of the Role Assigned by Planners to Competition
Although health planners have a new statutory dutv to judge, on the merits and
for each type of service, the value of the marketplace as a mechanism for revealing
what the public wants, it is not altogether clear how this responsibility will be
enforced. It is unlikely that DHHS, wedded as it is to the conventional v'iew of
competition's value and desirability, will encourage the planning agencies to adopt
Congress' more sanguine view. Moreover, Congress will probably not be perceived
to be so singleminded on this issue that health planners will automatically respect
its preferences. Thus, unless the courts are in a position to enforce stated Congres-
sional preferences, the effect of the new declaration of comlpetition's desirability
may depend on its hortatory value alone. For this reason, it seems appropriate, in
an effort to educate planner-regulators on their new deregulatory responsibilities,
to include a somewhat technical discussion of the ways in which disappointed
applicants for certificates-of-need may obtain judicial review of agency actions
affecting competition.
In fact, there appears to be some question whether the cotrts will have an
adequate opportunity to review health planners' conclusions on competition's value
45. H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 35, at 53.
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with respect to particular services. If such conclusions are embodied, either explicitly
or implicitly, in a state's health plan, 45a a state certificate-of-need agency's decision
to deny certification on the ground of inconsistency with the plan might not be
appealable on the basis that the plan's determination of competition's undesirability
was not based on evidence or reasoned findings. Although principles of admiinistra-
tive law usually allow attacks on agency rules that are inconsistent with the statute
being implemented, the case here is peculiar in that the "rule"-if the state health
plan (SHP) can be analogized to a regulation-is not the product of the same
agency whose decision is being reviewed. Indeed, the state agency would not have
access to or be able to provide to a reviewing court the full record on which the
SHP was based. For these reasons, ordinary judicial review of certificate-of-need
decisions would not permit the court to assess whether Congress's declared prefer-
ence for competition had been given due weight in determining the outcome.
The remedy of a certificate-of-need applicant whose competitive entry is foreclosed
by the SHP is to seek review of the SHP itself. This would have to he done
administratively in the first instance, probably by applying to either the HSA or the
Statewide Health Coordinating Council (SHCC), depending on where the SHP was
in the three-year cycle of review and revision. Under the 1979 amendments, the
applicant appears to be legally entitled to a hearing and a reasoned decision,
supported by evidence, on his claim that compeition would he vahlable with respect
to the particular service, and in the particular market, in question. Judicial review
to determine whether this right had been accorded might be deemed appropriate
at either of two points. One possibility is that review would be allowed in federal
court under federal law upon the HSA's contrary deterniination. on tlie theory
that the HSA's health systems plan (HSP) was essentially final and open for
revision by the SHCC only on matters affecting "statewide health needs.'"
7
Alternatively, the SHCC might be deemed the final decision maker, so that review
would be granted, in state court under state law, only after that state instrunmentali-
ty had acted. a In either event, the decision maker would have to show that a
record had been made that supported the outcome.
Although Congress has made no provision for judicial review of the actions of
either the HSA or the SHCC and has not iade clear which is the final decision
maker on localized issues, the better view would seem to be that the HSA, as a
nongovernmental body, gives only recommendations: otherwise, a severe problem
of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private entity\ would exist.
45a. In its commentary on regulations implementing the 1979 planning amendments, DHHS
"emphasizes that it is through the development of plans thai planning agencies should determine
whether a specific health service responds to competitive forces. not through individual determinations
as [certificate-of-need] applications are being reviewed.' 45 Fed. Req. 69740, 69771 (1980).
46. Planning Amendments of 1979 § I16(b) [amending § 1532(b)(6) of the Public Health Service
Act].
47. Public Health Service Act § 1524(c)(2)(A).
48. The planning law does not refer to the SHCC as a state instrtnentality but contemplates that
the Governor will (1) appoint the members of the SHCC (although at least 60 percent of the members
are chosen from lists of nominees submitted by the state's HSAs): (2) select the SHCC's chairman with
the advice and consent of the State Senate: and (3) exercise a veto over an\ draft State health plan that
he "determines does not effectively meet the statewide health needs of the State as determined by' the
state certificate-of-need agency. Public Health Service Act § 1524, as amended.
49. See, e.g., Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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A consequence of this reading would be to make the SHCC responsible for
according due process to would-be competitors' claims that market forces should be
allowed to operate with respect to particular services. Because, as later discussion
demonstrates, this matter is amenable to proof by specific evidence, a hearing and
findings of fact are appropriate. Moreover, because Congress has provided a clear
legal standard for application to the facts surrounding a particular service, the
SHCC's function in making the definitive choice between regulation and competi-
tion that is required by sections 1502(b)(2) and (3) is clearly adjudicative, not
legislative, thus triggering due process requirements and the availability of judicial
review. 50 On similar reasoning, opponents of competition should be given standing
to oppose provisions of the SHP that would encourage it.
The 1979 amendments' substantial changes in the character and responsibility
of the SHCC, by giving it more formal status as an agency of state government and
new duties to afford hearings and to decide disputed issues, would seem to confirm
the view that the SHCC's decisions in promulgating the SHP are final and
reviewable agency actions. The result is that aggrieved certificate-of-need applicants
may, in some instances, have to pursue their rights, not before the state agency,
but before the SHCC. Even though the peculiarities of this amalgam of regulation
and planning make it hard to predict with certainty whether, where, and how the
courts will intevene, judicial review of the SHCC's rulings on competition's value
and efficacy should be available. The 1979 amendments, in addition to strengthening
the planner's hand by making the SHP conclusive on such matters as competition's
role, also formalized the planning process so that it would not effectively foreclose
private rights. Congress thus left the courts in a position to review, on appropriate
application, the planners' disposition of claims to the effect that Congress' prefer-
ence for allowing competition to operate wherever it is efficacious had been
violated.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether state courts will be at all insistent on
furthering Congress' desire that compeitition be given a fair hearing on its merits
in formulating parts of the SHP. It is perhaps probable that most of them will
defer to planners' conventional assessments, but, as the federal courts have done
from time to time in reviewing administrative action, they may sometimes be able
to prevent the planners from selling out competition too quickly.-" Some substan-
tive outcomes may therefore be affected. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that
the courts cannot be counted on to revolutionize health planning. The ultimate
50. § 116(d)(3) of the Planning Amendments of 1979 amends § 1532(b) of the Public Health Service
Act so as to make a state agency's final decision on a certificate-of-need request subject to judicial review
in the state courts. § 116(d)(3) goes on to say that the requirement for judicial review "may, as
appropriate, apply to other review programs." Among the other review programs discussed in § 1532
are those carried out by the SHCC. Judicial review of SHCC decisions on the state health plan would
certainly seem "appropriate" since the 1979 planning amendments make the state health plan binding
on certificate-of-need agencies. Planning Amendments of 1979 § 117(a) [adding § 1527(a)(5) to the
Public Health Service Act]. It would be odd to grant judicial review of state agency decisions but not of
the SHCC decisions that underlie them.
51. E.g., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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check on anticompetitive regulation must be political. Whatever their precise legal
meaning, the procompetition provisions in the 1979 amendments may only be
important if they are backed by political as well as occasional legal sanctions.
E. The Policy Significance of' the New Regulatory Mandate
Taken together, the procompetition amendments of 1979 fundamentally alter
the character and thrust of the health planning and certificate-of-need enterprise.
Whereas the command-and-control mentality and the idea of allocating resources
through central planning previously supplied the health planning law's sole foun-
dation, the law now embraces a mix of strategies and gives clear instructions to the
planners and regulators that allocation by market forces is to be preferred if it can
reasonably be expected to serve the public well.
The legal and policy significance of the new regulatory mandate can perhaps be
most fully appreciated in the light of more general developments in regulatory
reform at the federal level. Among the recent regulatory reforms and proposals
reflecting policies toward regulation and competition that are similar to those
embodied in the health planning amendments are: President Carter's 1978 execu-
tive order directing executive-branch agencies to weigh the economic impact of
regulatory initiatives5 2 and several pending legislative proposals to extend similar
regulatory analysis requirements to independent regulatory agencies. Though
similar to those initiatives, the health planning amendments seem somewhat better
calculated to make a real difference in regulatory outcomes. Because those other
measures were triggered in large part by concern over the high compliance costs
occasioned by some "social" regulation-that is. controls to protect health and
safety and the environment-they less clearly establish that the restoration of
competition is also a paramount regulatory objective. Moreover. because the
mandates in those measures are not industry-specific, the regulators will find it easy
to conclude that the message was intended for someone else. Finally, the reform
measures reflect some reluctance to allow the courts to review specific regulatory
actions in the light of the new instructions, and thus the message is largely
hortatory, depending for its effectiveness solely on what it may convey to the
agencies about the attitudes of their political overseers. The health planning
amendments, on the other hand, being industry-specific, enforceable in court, and
reflecting an emerging seriousness in Congress about competition in the health
sector, would seem to be of a substantially different order. Indeed, Congress
appears to have departed very far from its customary practice of leaving the
regulators' mandate vague and internally inconsistent, thus f)rcing them to make
the hard policy choices.
Although many regulatory reform proposals have been addressed primarily to
the need for benefit/cost analysis in health and safety and environmental regula-
tion, there has also been explicit recognition of a need to assure that regulation
52. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1978 Compilation).
53. E.g., S. 262, S. 755, and H.R. 77, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). For a discussion of these and
some similar bills, see Symposium On the New Regulatory Reformers, 3 R-;UAI.ATION 17 (1979). Proposals
comparable to those listed will undoubtedly be considered by the 94th Congress.
H EALTIH PI-:ANNING;
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
does not suppress competition any more than is necessary. This theme has most
recently appeared in a bill offered in late 1979 with such wide bipartisan support
that its passage in some form seemed a reasonable prospect. 54 The Regulatory
Flexibility and Administrative Reform Act 55 would require federal agencies, before
adopting a policy or rule, to consider its "effects on competition'" and to make "a
finding that the policy or rule is the least anticompetitive alternative legally and
practically available to the agency to achieve its statutory goals.' This latter
mandatory finding would be subject to judicial review.58- The new requirements to
maintain competition are specifically directed to agencies that are engaged in
economic, as opposed to social, regulation.
Although S. 2147 would not apply, by its terms, to the health planning and
regulatory agencies contemplated in Public Law 93-64 1, its mandate is essentially
the same as that already incorporated, according to the foregoing analysis, in the
1979 amendments. The requirement that health planners and regulators assess,
with respect to each particular service, the market's efficacy as a resource allocator
corresponds directly to the reformers' proposal to require that "economic regulatory
agencies . . .choose the least anticompetitive alternative when issuing a major rule
or policy." 59 Two proposed legislative findings incorporated in S. 2147 state the
same general presumption favorable to competition that is reflected in the health
planning amendments:
(9) in the normal course of events, the free market is the appropriate means for
allocating goods and services and has proved to be the mhost effective means of
regulating the economy;
(10) to encourage competition and innovation, governnent regulations should
not impose needless entry barriers to the marketplace.'"
At the time the 1979 amendments were adopted, there was no other federal
regulatory statute-with the possible exception of recent airline legislation' t-that
was as explicit and compelling in its mandate to promote competition as the health
planning legislation. Given this state of the deregulation art and the extraordinary
difficulty of introducing competition in health services, it appears that Congress
took just about the longest step it could possibly have taken toward the goal of
deregulation of the health sector. While it remains to be seen how far toward that
goal it will be possible to go, the law is surprisingly clear. Nevertheless, it is by no
means certain that a change in the statutory formulation of a regulatory mandate
can make much practical difference. Indeed, the practical significance of the
procompetition language in the 1979 amendments depends ultimately on many
other matters, including the willingness of planner-regulators to honor its intent,
54. But see Clark, Regulatory "Reform" May Lose to Regulatory "Revolution" Advocates. 12 NAT'L J.
969 (1980).
55. S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
56. Id. § 641.
57. Id. § 641(a)(4).
58. Id. § 628.
59. Id. § 641(a)(4).
60. Id. § 101(9)(10).
61. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
[Vol. 44: No. I
Page 33: Winter 1981]
the true potential of competition as an allocator of resources in the health sector,
and the willingness of Congress to take some other steps to improve competition's
efficacy. The remainder of the article attempts to shed light on some of these
imponderables.
III
THINKING CONCRETELY ABOUT MARKET FAILURE
As A RATIONALE FOR COMMAND-AND-CONTROL INTERVENTION
The thesis of this article is that the health care systenfs planner-regulators,
before exercising their jurisdiction to limit entry and restrict competition in a
particular category of health services, should assess the affected market's actual and
potential ability to allocate resources of the plarticulalr type involved. If comnpetition
appears to be a reasonably reliable social control mechanism under all the circum-
stances, then regulation should f)ster it rather than supplanting it v colinmand-anld-
control intervention. Wholehearted acceptance of this simple Cnceptlalization of
the regulators' task would greatly affect the regulatory agenda, the nature of
health planning, the substance of many regulatory decisions, and, in the long iun.
the nature of the health care system as a whole. Although it has been argued above
that the planner-regulators are now under an enforceable statultorv dut to adopt
essentially the recommended approach, this discussion is concerned is much with
persuading health planners of the logic of the approach as with telling them their
legal responsibilities. In fact, more progress in increasing competition's role in the
industry can be anticipated fron the creative efforts of i minority of' planner-
regulators who share a belief' in its potentill efficacy than froin judicial enforcement
of the new statutory mandate against regulators who are disinclined to accept it.
The starting point in educating planner-regulators to competition's potential is
a careful diagnosis of the market's past failure to impose dUe constraints on the
escalation of costs. Certificate-of-need requirements have been imposed primarily
as a response to the distortions of the demand for- medical care that are perceived
to flow from the availability of third-party payment. But, while this general
rationale has substantial validity, it does not finally establish the necessity fo-
quantitative determinations of need with respect to everv facility or service within
the regulators' jurisdiction. In fact, many different circumstances surrounding a
particular service and its financing nax reduce the need for stich command-and-
control regulation, particularly if' an adIustment for regulal ions own shortcomings
is made on the proregulation side of the regulatory balance. In order to appreciate
the significance of specific characteristics of health services and their financing that
affect the need for command-and-control regulation, it is important to understand
the market failure to which regulation is addressed.
A. The Problem: Not Third-Party Payment Itself. But InadLequacies in its I)esign
There is a pervasive assumption that third-party payment is itself' the market
failure that necessitates governmental intervention and that, because third-party
financing of some health care is inevitable, so is regulation. The underlying idea is that
health insurance, though clearly needed to protect people against unpredictable
Hi:.x.I.TH I.:\NNIN(;
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
costs, is so destructive of cost-consciousness at the point of consumption that
price competition becomes impossible, leaving only cost-escalating nonprice compe-
tition to operate. If the analysis stops here, with the recognition of what economists
call "moral hazard" 6 -a costly phenomenon that is associated with insurance of all
kinds-the case for intervention seems strong. But this is the point where analysis
should begin, not end. While a full critique is impossible here, a few essential
points can be made.
63
Precisely because of the moral hazard problem that consumers face in insuring
themselves against health care costs, one could reasonably expect several things to
happen in a competitive market with normal incentives." First, because the cost of
insuring is raised by moral hazard, consumers would not purchase insurance
against all risks and would instead bear more of them personally: they would also
be inclined to obtain fuller coverage of those services that are nondiscretionarv-
such "necessities" as orthopedic care for broken bones-than of services whose
consumption depends primarily on how cheap they are. Second, competing health
insurers, seeking to provide the most cost-effective coverage, would take steps to
limit the exposure of the insurance fund, using techniques analogous to-but, clue
to obvious circumstantial differences, different from-the use of claims adjusters
and multiple estimates in automobile collision insurance. The challenge to find
better ways to control costs would lead in many directions, but the universal
objective would be to discover optimal combinations of strategies for dealing with
moral hazard while providing good quality care and essential financial protection.
Thus, the design of health insurance benefit packages and the administration of
claims in a competitive market would take into account the complex trade-offs
among such factors as the extent of particular risks, individuals' ability and
willingness to bear risk, the price elasticity of demand for various services (that is,
the exposure to moral hazard), and the administrative costs and acce)tability of
various cost-containment methods.
If private insurers could not design efficient systems for controlling moral
hazard, alternative delivery systems, such as HM/1Os, might turn out to do the job
better and succeed to the insurers' business. While the necessity For meeting price
competition in the market for prepayment plans supplies the essential discipline,
the key to the cost-containment success of alternative delivery systems is their closer
integration of the financing and the delivery of care. Such integration reduces the
third-party effect by bringing providers, whose decisions ultimately determine
costs, under some kind of central control by a cost-conscious health plan operator.
Internal management arrangements in an alternative delivery system can take
many different forms, including a direct employer-employee relationship, a con-
tract embodying understandings on prices and administrative requirements, inter-
62. See Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 Am . E(oN. REV. 531 (1968).
63. For a more extended discussion of why the market has failed to control health costs and how
market forces might be strengthened, see Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the
Private Sector's Hand, I J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 471 (1977).
64. For more extended discussion of what consumers and their insurers might do to control moral
hazard, see Havighurst & Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 300 N :w EN.. J. MED. 1298 (1979);
Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DtKEt L.J. 303. 321-35.
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nal peer-review mechanisms, or some carefully designed incentive arrangement.
Insurers could themselves organize alternative deli'erv systenis by getting provid-
ers to accept contractual requirements or )by separately rating provider groups that
have their own methods of internal discipline. It will be noted that the HNIO
concept, as it has evolved, does not encompass all of the mechanisms that a
competitive market might yield to deal with the cost pl)blemll.'-'
With this wide variety of techniques available for controlling costs without
Undue sacrifice of other Values, the competitive market would seem to have
considerable potential for accommodating the complex trade-offs that exist. lre-
cisely because no "ideal" solution can be identified and hecause different consunI-
ers and providers will prefer different arrangements, the com)etitive process has
important advantages over command-and-control regulation, which tends to seek
"one right way." For all these reasons. the presence of thrd-party palnent in the
market is not, by itself, a sufficient justiticatlion for regulatory intervention.
B. Identifying the True Causes of Maiket Failure
The conclusion that third-party payment alone does not Justify regulation does
not necessarily constitute an argument for regulation's immediate repeal. The
point is not that there is no market failure requilring policy makers* attent ion but.
rather, that its nature is considerably different from wlhat is collonlx understood
and that its causes must be looked for at a deeper level.
As the previous discussion implies, the market for health services and the
market for health insurance or other forms of financial protection cannot work
well-and, in particular, cannot achieve the needed closer integration of financing
and delivery-unless certain fundamental conditiois are satisfied. First, onsumers
must have a strong incentive to choose health plans that eftfectlivel\ control costs.
Second, health insurers must be free to design coverage and administrative ar-
rangements in the consumer's interest. And. third, alternative deliverv systems
must have unrestricted market opportunities so that tle\ call be organized to
supply any lacks in the third-party system. It is the tlailure of the market to sat isfv
these conditions in the past that accounts For the felt need foi regulatioti.'"' By the
same token, the increasingly strong possibility that these conditions are beginning
to be satisfied in a few markets, and will be satisfied more fully and in more
markets in the future, makes it necessary that the health care system's planner-
regulators consider closely whether their regulatory services are in fact needed in
specific circumstances.
The stated prerequisites for efficient performance in ile l)rivatelv fianted
sector have not been met in the past for essentially three reasois. which together
65. For descriptions of some innovative health plans that depart from the standard HNIO model, see
Ellwood, The Health Care Alliance, in 2 NA-IlO\AL COsMM lSSWX )ON lIi I F COSI OF MtDICAL CARE 1976-1977.
153 (1978); Enthoven. Shattuck Lecture--Cu/ttng Cost lWithou (.ultig the, Quality o f.are, 298 N w ENG.. J.
MED. 1229 (1978); Evans, Physician Based Group Insuiam': .4 Poposal lr Aledical Cost Cmtrol. 320 N vw
EN;. J. MED. 1280 (1980); Gumbiner, Pror Authorizatizo Cuts Hospital Costs. N.xI'i. UNDERWRITRI 10
(May 3, 1980): Moore, Cost Containment Throiugh Risk-Sharing by Prima'ry-Care Physiciams, 300 Nw xs ENG.
. MED. 1359 (1979).
66. Havighurst, supra note 63.
HtEA.TH~i- PLA:NNING;
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
account for the market failure that has occurred. First, federal tax law has strongly
biased consumers toward buying comprehensive "first-dollar" coverage and dis-
couraged insurer cost-containment efforts. As a tax-free fringe benefit, employer-
purchased health insurance permits employees' health care expenses to be paid
with untaxed dollars, providing a strong incentive to buy more than the optimal
amount of insurance. 6 7 From another perspective, the tax law dilutes the value to
the consumer of any savings that the insurer might achieve through cost-containment
efforts and the employer might pay out as additional wages. Because a dollar saved
is not a dollar earned, insurers will be less inclined to eliminate questionable
payments.
Second, most decisions on insurance coverage are not made by the consumer,
but by employers and unions, whose own interest in maintaining a beneficent
image in the employees' eyes may cause them to act against the employees' true
interests. Thus, in facing the trade-offs between more insurance coverage and
more take-home pay, an employer or union leader may act either politically,
emphasizing to the rank and file the visible benefits and obscuring the hidden
costs, or paternalistically. Either way, the effect is likely to be that the decision
maker places a higher value on comprehensive, hassle-free coverage than would
the employee if he or she were offered a chance to economize. Congress is
currently considering proposals to require that employers offer employees several
health plans, making the same contribution regardless of the plan chosen. The
purpose would be to give each individual a meaningful opportunity to make an
economizing choice. Variations on this proposal would allow some of the savings
from such an economizing choice to be received tax-free,"9 whereas other proposals
would place limits on the exclusion of employer-paid premiums from taxable
income. 70 Thus, significant changes are possible in the area of consumer incen-
tives. 7t Even without such legislation, however, the market already has begun to
feature greater cost-consciousness than in the past, and an increasing number of
employers now offer their employees a range of choices in health care benefits.
These private developments are contributing to a gradual weakening of the
premises on which regulation is based.
The third significant cause of the insurance market's failure to respond to
consumers' cost concerns is the effectiveness of privately imposed restraints of
trade that have inhibited the market's performance from the beginning. 72 The
67. Feldstein and Friedman estimate that the exclusion of employer-paid premiums from employee
taxable income and wages means that group insurance can be bought through the workplace at a
discount of almost 35 percent. Feldstein & Friedman, Tax Subsidies, the Rational Demand fr Insurance and
the Health Care Crisis, 7 J. PuB. EcoN. 155, 156 (1977). Even after the insurer's administrative expenses
are deducted (expenses which replace costs that patients and providers would have to bear), the
discount on services purchased is still substantial.
68. E.g., H.R. 5740, S. 1485, and S. 1590, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Similar bills will -be before
the 97th Congress.
69. E.g., S. 1590.
70. E.g., H.R. 5740.
71. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that S. 1590 would cause employees to
choose less extensive health insurance benefits, thus reducing private medical spending by $10 to $15
billion in 1985. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for S. 1590 (March 17, 1980).
72. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 Dt Ki L.J. 303.
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medical profession and the hospital industry have effectively shaped private third
parties' methods of doing business, preventing them from becoming aggressive
purchasers of services and thus from triggering provider competition based on
price, efficiency, and willingness to cooperate in cost containment.7 3 Moreover, the
provider community in most markets has prevented various alternative delivery
systems from having easy access to the market.7 ' Because of the restraints imposed,
the market has been unreceptive to innovations addressed to the cost and moral
hazard problems. Current efforts to enforce the antitrust laws in the health care
industry may shortly break down the most substantial barriers to competition,
allowing the insurance industry and alternative delivery systems to evolve in the
directions indicated by consumer preferences. 7 -5 While much remains to be done in
clarifying the law and bringing providers to account, the greater problem may now
lie in overcoming insurer inertia 7 and free-rider problems 7 7 that discourage attacks
on the barricades.
What needs to be observed here is that the market failures that have prevented
the health insurance market from meeting consumers' needs may all be remedia-
ble. The antitrust enforcement effort has already begun to eliminate the most
clear-cut professional abuses, and it will soon be considerably more difficult than it
is today to argue that the market is not revealing consumers' true preferences.
Indeed, in several markets already, alternative delivery systems are well enough
established and consumers have enough competitive options that the need for any
entry regulation at all is open to question. 7' Although one could argue that
command-and-control regulation must dominate the system as long as the tax law
is not changed and consumer choice remains restricted in some employment
settings, the legislative choice not to change those competition-limiting conditions
need not be deemed to render market forces wholly unreliable. As long as private
73. See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, No. 9118 (FTC, March 25, 1980) (administrative law judge
held that Indiana Federation of Dentists was founded as part of an organized effort to impede insurers'
cost-containment efforts); Michigan State Med. Soc'y, No. 9129 (FTC, filed 'July 27, 1979) (FTC alleges
that the Michigan State Medical Society organized a boycott of an independent Blue Shield plan that
undertook unwanted cost-containment efforts). See also Havighurst & Kissam, The Antitrust Iniplications of
Relative Value Studies in Medicine, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 48 (1979) (suggesting that profession-
sponsored relative value studies violate the antitrust laws in part because they suppress independent
insurers' cost-containment initiatives). But see United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473
F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (held that a profession-sponsored relative value study did not violate the
antitrust laws).
74. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affd, 317 U.S. 519
(1943) (criminal conviction for anti-HMO activities upheld); United States v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Center
(D.C. Fla. 1980), 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,748 (proposed consent decree barring anti-HMO
activities); Forbes Health System Med. Staff, (1976-1979 FTC Transfer Binder] TRADE RE(;. REP. (CCH)
21,587 (FTC File No. 7810009, June 27, 1979) (proposed consent decree barring anti-HMO activities).
For a case study in how the medical profession has disciplined innovative plans, see Goldberg and
Greenberg, The Effect of Physician Controlled Health Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 48 (1979).
75. Supra note 24.
76. Havighurst, supra note 72, at 336-42.
77. See M. PAULY, THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN NATIONAL. Hi .I--. INStRANCE 37-38 (1979).
78. See Christianson & McClure, supra note 29.
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restraints are curbed, the private market can function reasonably well even if the
tax law continues to distort incentives and somewhat affects the equilibrium that
market forces seek.
The implication of these observations for regulation is that market conditions
can no longer be presumed to require command-and-control interventions in all
cases. In keeping with their new Congressional mandate, the planner-regulators
must consider much more than merely whether third-party payment exists. They
must also ask whether it still takes forms that fail to protect consumers from moral
hazard, whether innovation in the financing system is still restrained, whether it is
unreasonable to expect third parties to address a specific cost problem, and
whether consumers have enough alternatives available to constrain effectively the
performance of the third-party payers and the providers whose costs they under-
write. More generally, they must ask themselves whether, given the new opportuni-
ties for evolution toward more cost-effective types of insurance coverage and
alternative financing and delivery mechanisms, it is right ftr regulation to retard
that desirable evolution by intervening to shield inefficient insurers (and their
customers) against the consequences of their failure to innovate. Later discussion
suggests that the most responsible regulatory policy will sometimes be to withdraw
such protection, allowing competitive pressures to induce insurers and consumers
to seek new forms of insurance coverage or alternative delivery arrangements. It
should be clear that regulation could easily become-and should strive to avoid
becoming-the sole remaining source of market failure, shoring ip obsolete,
dysfunctional financing mechanisms and barricading the avenues of change.
IV
WEIGHING "FACTORS WHICH AFFECT I Hti EFFECT I ( COMPE- I I ION"
Since command-and-control regulation is not warranted simply by the availabili-
ty of some third-party payment, attention must be (irected to specific characteris-
tics of a service and its financing that affect the need for central allocative
decisions. The 1979 amendments instruct the regulator to consider, as a threshold
issue, "the factors which affect the effect of competition on the supply of the
health services being reviewed.'' 7 ' The following discussion sets forth a list of such
factors useful in appraising existing market conditions. However, in considering
whether the market is currently capable of perfbrming well, the planner-regulators
should not lose sight of the potential for change in traditional payment mecha-
nisms that may alter the need for regulatory intervention. Later discussion argues
not only that the planner-regulators should make allowances for future develop-
ments but that they should actively encourage such change-even to the extent of
withdrawing regulatory controls that protect the private sector against the need to
change. Throughout the rest of the article, the reader will detect an urgency about
using regulatory powers sparingly wherever the competitive private sector could, if
it would, better perform the cost-containment job.
79. Planning Amendments of 1979 § 103(c) [amending § 1532(c) of the Public Health Service Act].
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A. The Burden of the New Responsibilities
Although analysis of the appropriateness of command-and-control regulation in
specific circumstances can be a complex undertaking, the planner-regulators' inqui-
ry into this new and unfamiliar set of questions should not add excessively to their
overall regulatory burden. If the regulators' analyses are carried out in good faith
and if market-strengthening activities are also undertaken, the result should be to
narrow significantly the range of the regulators' command-and-control activities.
To the extent that portions of the health services market can be left to market
forces subject only to general oversight, the planner-regulators would be free to
concentrate on regulating in those areas where their services are most needed-
hospital beds, for example-and on efforts to improve the functioning of market
forces through consumer education, information dissemination, and encourage-
ment of innovation in the financing system.
There is also reason to expect that day-to-day regulatory burdens will not lbe
greatly increased by the new necessity for weighing competition's efficacy. Once
basic understanding has been achieved, many services can be categorized as
allocable or not by market forces without extensive data collection and close
analysis. Moreover, the local health systems plan and the state health plan can
incorporate findings on the efficacy of competition with respect to each type of
service, thus reducing the need to address the issue on a case-by-case basis.
Although it cannot be denied that the new responsibility to foster useful
competition adds to the complexity of the planner-regulators' task, that is not a
valid reason for not assuming it or an argument for misreading or misapplying the
new statutory mandate. Obviously, the best way to simplify the regulators' task is to
hasten the transition to a system in which consumer incentives and competition (1o
operate effectively. Thus, health planners' efforts to encourage financing system
reforms could improve the quality of residual regulation. Changes in the tax laws,
antitrust enforcement, and legislative efforts to widen the range of consumer
choice would also be desirable, and, with the new regulatory mandate, such public
measures to improve competition would be less likely to have their beneficial
impact blunted by anticompetitive regulation.
B. Characteristics of a Service and Its Financing that Affect the Need for
Command-and-Control Regulation
The following discussion briefly sets forth nine specific "factors which affect the
effect of competition" and which would thus be relevant in any assessment of the
vitality of the market as an allocator of health services of a particular type.
Although the natural tendency of many regulators will be to pick and choose
among the listed factors to find support for the result they desire to reach,
responsible regulation requires consideration of the entire list. Weights must of
course be varied according to the circumstances, and the factors should not be
used merely as a checklist but should serve as a guide to the exercise of'judgment
on the ultimate question: whether, under all the circumstances, the encouragement
of competition would be in the public interest as Congress has defined it.
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1. A Statutoiy Distinction and its Questionable Relevance
Institutional versus noninstitutional services
It is possible to read section 1502(b)80 as putting "inpatient health services and
other institutional health services" permanently on the agenda for command-and-
control regulation, since that section seems to characterize such services as being
among those "for which competition does not or will not appropriately allocate
supply." Although it will be tempting for health system planner-regulators to read
this language as establishing a conclusive presumption against competition's efficacy
for all but noninstitutional services, this reading seems incorrect in view of
legislative history indicating, with specific reference to institutional services, that a
change of the financing system might obviate the need for regulation. 8' Moreover,
there is no current policy basis for distinguishing between institutional and
noninstitutional services, particularly as those services are defined in the statute.
On the contrary, dysfunctional payment methods, while they do apply more
pervasively to some inpatient services, are applicable to services of all types and
affect some noninstitutional services more than some institutional ones.8 2 On
balance, the distinction between institutional and noninstitutional services seems the
beginning, not the end, of the analysis.
2. Factors Related to Financing
a. The scope of third-party payment
If third-party payment does not cover the service to a substantial enough
degree to induce significant abuse, the planner-regulators should deem demand
factors not to preclude competition. In judging whether third-party payment is too
widespread to trust the marketplace, it is also appropriate to focus on whether the
scope of third-party payment is being dictated by consumer choice or is instead a
reflection of insurers' or providers' collective interests. While the current weakness
of competitive bargaining at the interface between traditional health care plans and
providers suggests that command-and-control regulation may well be justifiable
under prevailing conditions, the next factor invites exploration of circumstances of
health plan operation that might point to a different conclusion.
b. The character of third-party payment
The market's efficacy would be most obvious in a market in which all care was
provided through competing closed-panel HMOs, but other types of health care
plans could also be expected to cope with the moral hazard problem well enough
to obviate public oversight.83 It is not enough, however, simply to observe that all
80. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
81. H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 35, at 53-54.
82. The definition of "institutional health services" found in § 1531(5) of the Public Health Service
Act includes all routine outpatient services of a hospital. Certain expensive outpatient diagnostic services
provided in physicians' offices would seem to present a greater danger of abuse of the financing system.
Nursing home services, less often paid for on a cost-reimbursement basis, may also present fewer
problems than some noninstitutional services.
83. Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 64.
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plans must be marketed competitively, since. even though it might be assned that
they cannot automatically pass on cost increases. interplanl competitin signifies
very little if the plans are not able or do not choose to pr)cure providers' services
on a competitive basis. Thus, it is only to the extent that health care )lans are both
motivated by competition to control costs and free to purchase needed inputs
competitively, that they and the providers doing business with them (1o not reqUire
regulatory oversight.
Indicia of effective health care plan competition in tile procurement of provider
services include, in particular, tie use by competing insurers of provider participa-
tion agreements that specify both price and adhinistrtative requirements necessary
to implement utilization controls antd coverage limitations. But intnovations that
effectively restore the diemand side's disciplinary ctIal)ility need not be even this
radical. Thus, insurers might use deductibles 01I- coinsurance l) a extent leaving
consumers responsible for paying Inal\ Costs out of pocket and thus t0sl-c)nsciotts
enough to deter many provider price and cost increasesS A greater Impact on the
moral hazard would result if particular benefits were paid oi a tfixed-dollar basis.
leaving consumers conscious of the marginal dollar and thus with an incentive to
seek out providers willing to provide the service for less." ' If insurers. provider
groups, and others were relatively free to organmize health c-are alliances and to use
participation agreements and other measures that seemed cost-effective. it would
not be essential that all care be paid for under such atrangements or through
HMOs before one could conclude that the market \\as capable of allocating
resources well enough. Indeed, it is argued later that the potentiality of innovative
payment methods may alone obviate conr -and-c nlu regulati( ut.
c. Who bears the cost burden of obsolete facilities?
One theory that has been widely used to justify pro)tectionist elrt\ controls in
regulated industries is that, because existing facilities' cal)ital costs must be paid for
by consumers in any event, allowing new competition that renders existing facilities
obsolete may be unduly costly to the public as a whole.s IThis theor\ has often
been employed in health sector regulation to ftrustrate such competitive develop-
ments as the construction of ambulatory surgical facilities, which are deemed to
drain patients away from existing hospitals wit hoot redtcing their t x eriead. On
the other hand, Congress' grant of a broad exemption frot certifticate-of-need
requirements to HMOs may be leeied to reflect at least a partial rejection of this
theory, since HMOs* chief economizing skill is in substituting otlPatient lfor
impatient care.8 ' The impact of HMO competition on existing hospitals, and on
those committed to pay their capital costs, was apparently not a matter that
Congress viewed as a decisive consideration.
84. H. FRECH & P. GINSBURG;, PUBLIC INSURANCE IN PRIVAT'E NIFItAi MARKETS 17-26 (1978) (and
sources cited therein).
85. See, e.g., Pauly, Indemnity Itmurance foi Health Sen'ice El/iiei. 23 E:()N. & Bts. Bt 1.1.. 53 (1971).
86. See Havighurst. supra note 9, at 1156-58.
87. Luft, H-ow Do Health Maintenance (hganization. Achieve Theo Sa ing% ? 298 N F-:N ENG. J .. NI-D. 1336
(1978).
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The 1979 amendments did, however, expressly authorize the planner-regulators
to consider, as one factor in their certificate-of-need decisions, the impact of new
construction projects "on the costs and charges to the public of prov idling health
services by other persons."8 8 This language leaves regulators free to direct attention
to the way in which the capital costs of providers adversely affected by new
competition are handled by the financing system. The planner-regulators' attention
is thus drawn to the crucial question of whether the financing system reimburses
providers for the cost of obsolete facilities. The inquiry here is complicated, and a
final judgment may depend on a technical analysis of cost-reiIIbfL rsenent Formulas
(for example, is overhead allocated on the basis of the actual or some assumed
level of occupancy?) and of indemnification techniques (for example, do cost
sharing and indemnification limits Foster enough price competition to prevent costs
of obsolete facilities from being freely passed along?).
3. Additional Characteristics of' the Serice Itself
a. Nondiscretionary versus discretionary services
If demand for a particular service would not he much affected by changes in
price-that is, if the service is a "necessity" and not discretionarv"'-tlen the fact
that it is covered by third-party financing should not much affect its consuntption." 't
On the other hand, if new entrants are offering mnow (os tlx verions of the same
essential service, a different aspect of the moral hazard problem would be presented.''
88. Planning Amendments of 1979 § I 16 (g) [amending § 1532(c(9)(3() of the Public Health Service
Act].
89. Strictly speaking, medical care is best understood as a continuum that cannot simpy be divided
into the categories "necessary" and "unnecessary" or "discretionary" and "nondiscretionary." Although
either end of the continuum is care that is clearly necessary (nondiscretionary) or unnecessary
(discretionary), in the middle there is a vast gray area reflecting, among other things, scientific
uncertainty about the efficacy of various treatments and diagnostic tools and differences in the personal
characteristics (physiological, psychological, and emotional) of patients. Moreover, if' all medical services
are to be dichotomized, the only meaningful categories would distinguish services whose benefits exceed
their costs from services whose costs exceed their benefits. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with
Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs. 70 Nt'. U. L. Ri. 6, 9-20 (1975). See also A.
ENTHOVEN, supra note 27, at 1-12; L. RUSSELL, TECHNOI.;OV IN Hos'I ]A tS 1-4 (1979): Schwartz &Joskow,
Medical Efficacy Versus Economic Efficiency. 299 Ntsw EN(. J. MIDIi. 1462 (1978). Obsionusl,. the valuation of
benefits necessary for such categorizations would be extremely difficult.
90. The responsiveness of demand to changes in price (the price elasticity of demand) varies
considerably among medical services. For example, the lenand fi anbulatory care is significantly
more elastic than demand for inpatient hospital care. Phelps & Newhouse, Coiisrance, the Price of Tine,
and the Demand for Medical Services, 56 REs'. E(:ON. & St A 1. 337 (1974). However. most studies of demand
elasticity do not disaggregate demand beyond distinguishing between outpatient and inpatient services.
Even so, it seems clear that price elasticity would vary foi different inpatient services. See Havighurst,
The Role of Competition in Cost Containment, in U.S. FEDE-tRAi TRADE COXM'S, (;oMn II IO iN In I- HE..\Si
CARE SECTOR, supra note 12, at 361-63. An obvious example of a nondiscretionary inpatient service (with
a correspondingly low price elasticity) is emergency surgery to repair the damage done b\ trauma.
91. The same essential service might be made more costly in ans number of ways. In the case of
emergency surgery, for example, the patient's stay in the hospital might be lengthened. more expensive
diagnostic tests might be used, the number and quality of the attending staff might be increased, or the
hospital room made more pleasant and comfortable. Some or all of these added increments of "quality"
might increase the probability that the patient will fills recover. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to
characterize them as "necessities;" and certainly they are "discretionary."
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The added increments of "quality" might not themselves lbe necessities, vet, if the
third-party financing system were ready and willing to reimburse the added costs,
entry controls might seem appropriate. Nevertheless, the better means of cost
containment in the case of such nondiscretionary services would seem to be for the
third parties to limit what they will pay for each essential service on the basis of
what the service could be obtained for from an efficient provider."-9 If the
consumer were thus given an incentive to evaluate cost differentials, planner-
regulators could conclude that allowing free entry into the provision of such
services would allow low-cost providers at least to begin to compete with high-cost
providers. With such alternatives available, third-parties might more quickly per-
ceive the benefits of reimbursing providers or patients on some basis other than
costs incurred. Conversely, restrictions on entry would have the effect of confer-
ring a franchise on existing providers, putting pressure on third parties to cover
their high costs.
Not all health services are nondiscretionary, of course. Indeed, some are so
discretionary in all cases that their coverage by health insurance seems inappropri-
ate. 9 3 Because third-parties have available the strategy of totally excluding such
services from coverage or subjecting them to heavy copayment requirements,
regulation of the supply of such discretionary services by certificate-of-need might
seem unnecessary to protect against over-utilization induced by third-party pa\-
ment.94 Of course, such strategies may not be widely used because of tax consider-
ations, legal requirements, or administrative problems in drawing lines. In this
event, regulation will appear appropriate, but it should still be deemed desirable-and
possibly feasible-in the long run to allow the supply of such services to be
allocated by the market.
The case for entry regulation is perhaps strongest where, judging in benefit/cost
terms, the service is nonessential or discretionary in many cases but nondiscreiionary
in others. 9 5 Coverage of the service by third-party payers would be appropriate
only in the cases dictated by clear medical necessity, but for the health care plan to
distinguish one case from another would often reqluire complex administrative
mechanisms. Where such strategies are not cost-effective, regulatory intervention to
limit the supply of the service and bring about its rationing by providers will seem
plausible. )6 Nevertheless, planner-regulators must consider whether, even though
92. Pauly, supra note 85.
93. Cosmetic plastic surgery (other than to repair damage from trauma) is often cited as an example
of a highly discretionary service.
94. For example, if insurers exclude purely cosmetic surgery from coverage or subject it to heavy
copayments, regulators can safely permit free entry of ambulatory plastic surgery facilities.
95. Many, if not most, services fall into this category. It is often alleged, for example. that many
more hysterectomies and appendectomies are performed than are "necessary." Yet, in some cases,
hysterectomies and appendectomies are clearly "necessary" and "nondiscretionary."
96. Of course, the regulatory tools for limiting the provision of such services may be even less
reliable than the insurer mechanisms. Certificate-of-need regulators can limit the supply of surgical beds
and facilities but they cannot be assured that the limit will reduce the number of "unnecessar'"
procedures. Although the process by which hospitals ration services and facilities is poorl understood.
it seems unlikely that only the least cost-effective procedures are wrung out of tie system when an
external constraint is imposed. Indeed, the allocation of reduced hospital resources will often be
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practical measures seem available, special considerations have prevented third
parties from adopting them. Desirable innovation might be discouraged by fear of
provider displeasure and retaliation, the natural disinclination of' oligopolists to
compete in new and potentially disruptive ways, '7 the probability that rapid
imitation will deprive the innovators of a significant competitive advantage, and the
likelihood that some of the benefits of innovation will not be captured by the
innovator but will instead, as in the case of an innovation that favorably affects the
standard of medical practice in the community, accrue to others."H Possibly the
system's resistance to desirable change in such circumstances can be identified as a
market failure warranting health planners' intervention. It is suggested, however,
that the planners consider intervening to break up the logjam rather than simply
seizing on the market's temporary recalcitrance as an excuse to assume a com-
mand-and-control role.
b. The nature of substitutes for the service in question
Sometimes, the substitute service that is likely to be used when a regulation-
created supply constraint is encountered is more expensive than the competing
service being regulated.' ' When such a circumstance occurs, it invalidates a basic
assumption underlying certificate-of-need requirements-namely that reducing the
availability of a service will result in the use of less costly alternatives and savings to
the community. This problem is presented almost any time the proposed new
facility or service is one that substitutes for costly hospital care. Of course, if the
hospital bed supply has itself been closely tailored to fit the community's needs,
then it may be reasonable to expect the system as a whole to find ways to assure
that patients are treated in the surroundings most appropriate to their specific
condition. But hospital beds of each type are unlikely ever to be under such tight
control'Om Moreover, providers lack incentives and tools to allocate existing sup-
plies to patients strictly in accordance with medical need. In the real world,
therefore, regulatory discouragement of lower-cost competitors may be quite destruc-
tive. Indeed, the scarcity of such lower-cost alternatives will make it harder for the
planner-regulators to control the growth of the hospitals themselves.
In most of the cases in which these problems are encountered, there will also
exist the more commonly observed risk that the moral hazard will induce inappro-
priate utilization of the service in question by patients whose alternative is a
determined by nonmedical considerations-for example, the prestige that various services bring to the
hospital.
97. Havighurst, supra note 72, at 336-42.
98. M. PAUL', supra note 77.
99. For example, if regulation unduly limits the supply of nursing home beds, patients best cared
for in nursing homes might have to be cared for in hospitals. Similarly, if the supply of home health
services is restricted, patients might be forced to remain in nursing homes longer than necessary.
100. The Carter Administration contended that, despite the ongoing efforts of health planners and
certificate-of-need regulators, there were 130,000 unneeded hospital beds in the United States. As a
result, the Administration developed a package of new initiatives designed to limit federal financial
support for unnecessary hospital construction. Federal Support for Hospital Construction in Overbedded
Areas, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,701 (1980).
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lower-cost (rather than a higher-cost) service. In such cases, the regulators must
compare the benefits and costs of regulation very carefully. In their assessments,
they must not neglect to consider the ways in which the financing plans can
themselves affect the system's performance by seeking correct placement of their
beneficiaries.
c. The presence of capital investment
While third-party payment can induce inappropriate utilization and price esca-
lation for all types of services without regard to their capital intensity, capital
investment creates special claims on the future that regulation can appropriately
seek to minimize. First, the existing financing system embodies a tacit and incom-
plete, but still strong, commitment to reimburse providers for capital costs.""II
Second, hospital rate-setting regulation, largely borrowed from the public utility
field, often embodies the same commitment to cover capital costs-at least when a
certificate-of-need agency approves the investment. 102 Third, regulatory bodies of
all kinds, reflecting a bias toward fairness at the expense of efficiency, have long
indulged the "suck-cost obsession," which causes them automatically to reject any
competitive developments that would reduce the present value of regulated firms'
investments. 103 Finally, the political process is probably more responsive to claims
that investments would be devalued and bricks and mortar rendered obsolete than
to claims of less tangible consequences flowing from strengthened competition.
Health services that do not involve significant capital investments, such as home
health services, do not threaten to freeze the system because they are not frozen in
place. In an increasingly competitive market, they can expand or contract with
relative ease. Moreover, they do not present the same risk of embarrassment that
the planner-regulators face when a bricks-and-mortar facility is admitted to the
market today and rendered obsolete by market forces tomorrow. Precisely because
their admission to the market creates less of a political-economic barrier both to
market-inspired innovations and to regulatory changes of direction, new health
services that involve negligible capital outlays are less in need of strict command-and-
control regulation than other facilities and services.
d. The benefits of nonprice competition
Where price competition is ineffectual due to passive third-party payment, com-
petition may still play a constructive role in stimulating providers to strive for im-
proved quality, increased efficiency, and greater patient convenience and satisfaction.
101. See, e.g., J.FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 57-60 (1977); Wolk-
stein, The Impact of Legislation on Capital Development for Health Facilities, in HEALTH CARE CAPITAL:
COMPETITION AND CONTROL 7, 8-11, 21-25 (G. MacLeod & M. Perlman eds. 1978).
102. Bauer, Hospital Rate Setting-This Way to Salvation?, in HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT: SELECTED
NOTES FOR FUTURE POLICY 324, 348 (M. Zubkoff, I. Raskin. & R. Hanft eds. 1978). The hospital cost
containment legislation drafted by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources in the 96th
Congress would have allowed hospitals to pass-through the costs of all new projects granted certificates-of-
need. That bill was not passed by the full Senate, however.
103. R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE Ast COUNCIl. PROPOSAI.s 25-26 (1971).
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Because competition could be highly beneficial in promoting these values, reg-
ulators might be expected to establish the seriousness of countervailing hazards
before engaging in exclusionary regulation. This conclusion should hold even
though certificate-of-need requirements were introduced in large part because
competition in health services tended to focus on nonprice factors and thus to have
powerful cost-escalating tendencies. Congress explicitly recognized the value of
nonprice as well as price competition in the 1979 amendments, when it embraced
competition wherever it could "constructively serve ... to advance the purposes of
quality assurance, cost effectiveness, and access."' 10 4 It would seem that the benefits
of such competition are great enough that the regulators should be willing to
tolerate some uncertainty concerning cost impacts and even some limited cost
increases in order to obtain them.
The possible benefits of nonprice competition include improvements in the
quality of care, including not only the technical quality and intensity of services,
but also amenities and accessibility. Quality-promoting competition can also stimu-
late efficiency in the use of resources, since, as long as there is any limitation on
providers' ability to pass on particular costs, the pressures of nonprice competition
will force providers to employ available resources to the consumer's advantage. In
many circumstances, a strong argument can be made to the effect that nonprice
competition, because it stimulates attention to consumer needs and preferences and
induces the husbanding of resources so as to satisfy those needs and preferences
better, is preferable to no competition at all. 105
4. The Availability of Alternative Ways of Controlling the Service's Cost
The existence of nonmarket controls on cost
Given the benefits that may be derived from nonprice competition, planner-
regulators might encourage it if the risk of cost escalation were deemed not to be
great. One reason this risk might be acceptable is the existence of regulatory or
other nonmarket controls over both price and utilization. State hospital rate
regulation might be an inadequate protection, since many such programs are tied
closely to institution-specific costs and rely primarily on certificate-of-need determi-
nations to settle the legitimacy of the costs that a hospital wishes to pass on. On the
other hand, the well-regarded program in Maryland has largely ignored planning
decisions in rate setting. 10 6 This approach, plus rate setting that attaches only
limited weight to a particular institution's actual costs, would permit the planners to
encourage competition without fear that the public would be burdened with
excessive costs. Although the Carter Administration's original hospital cost con-
tainment proposal would have provided a backstop justifying more widespread use
104. Planning Amendments of 1979 §103(a) [amending §1502(a) of the Public Health Service Act].
105. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that nonprice competition in San Francisco's
physician services market has made doctors more responsive to their patients and improved the
accessibility of care. Chase, Will Surplus of M.D.s be Good for Patients? Look at San Francisco, Wall St. J.,
March 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
106. See Demkovich, Tough-Minded Cost Control Commission Keeps Lid on Maryland Hospital Rates, II
NAT'L J. 1361 (1979).
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of procompetitive strategies, a later version of the federal "cap" legislation would
have permitted automatic pass-through of the costs of all projects granted
certificates-of-need. 1
0 7
Government also seeks to control costs by various limitations on the price that it
will pay for services rendered to beneficiaries of public programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid. While cost reimbursement is the dominant method of payment in
these programs, there are some additional limits on what will be paid. Limitations
to reasonable costs have been introduced for hospitals under Medicare,' and
some state Medicaid programs pay nursing homes prospectively determined rates
that are not adjusted to cover actual costs. 10 9 Such rate controls might be deemed,
in specific cases, to diminish fears of cost-escalating impacts on public programs
enough to warrant an increase in beneficial nonprice competition.
Admitting a new service to the market as a competitive stimulus also raises the
risk that utilization could be inappropriately expanded. Though existing controls
over utilization practices are highly incomplete and of questionable value, 11 they
might be deemed to reduce the risk of serious over-utilization enough to permit
some competitive developments.
V
MARKET-FoRCIN; Ri(;t.AV ) 10N:
DEREGULATION AS A STNIUI.IiS "1"() NEEII) REORN
A. Choosing a Regulatory Strategy
The most radical position that health system planner-regulators might take is
that, in view of the availability of private cost-containment techniques, price and
utilization would be better controlled by competing financing plans and that entry
controls can never adequately serve the public. On this premise, they would
essentially withdraw from regulating new market entry and new investment on the
basis of need and focus their regulatory efforts only on preventing monopoly. The
goal of such deregulation would be to seek fundamental change exclusively
through the unleashing of market Forces. It is not at all clear that this radical
strategy would be irrational. Little evidence, after all. supports the effectiveness of
107. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources drafted such a pass-through provision,
but the revised bill was not reported to the Senate floor. As a result, no committee report on the bill
was filed and no official version of the pass-through provision is available for purposes of citation.
108. Social Security Amendments of 1972 § 223.
109. 3 CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUinE, 15,504 et seq.
110. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 89 (criticizing the Professional Standards Review
Organization program which reviews utilization by Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and some
privately insured patients); Havighurst, supra note 72, at 377-81 (suggesting that "foundations for
medical care" sponsored by the medical profession and providing utilization review services to private
insurers may not be aggressive enough in their cost-containment efforts and in fact may pose an
anticompetitive threat). See also Demkovich, The Ph'sician Peer Review Program-Does It Cost More than It
Saves?, 12 NAT'L J. 733 (1980); PSROs: Are The
' 
Worth What They Cost?, MED. WoRmL Niws 45 (July 21,
1980). But see Egdahl, Taft, Friedland, & Linde, The Potential of Organizations of Fee-for-Service Physicians
for Achieving Significant Decreases in Hospitalization, 186 ANNALS OF StRGERNs 388 (1977).
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supply-side controls to keep costs and prices down or to squeeze inappropriate
utilization out of the system.11
Although a "let-'er-rip" policy could be defended as a responsible regulatory
strategy, the mere theoretical possibility of private cost-containment efforts may be
too speculative to warrant its adoption. Such a laissez-faire policy depends on
strong, untested assumptions and is unlikely to work well without major change in
tax or other governmental policies and without effective antitrust enforcement." 2
In any event, it is almost certainly inconsistent with the regulators' statutory
mandate. The amended health planning legislation makes it quite clear that a
policy of deferring to market forces must be justified on the basis of reasonable
expectations that such forces can and will serve the public adequately. Moreover,
case law involving other regulated industries indicates that, while regulators must
give competition its due weight as a substitute for regulated monopoly, it cannot be
embraced without stated reasons and without evidence indicating a probability that
the public will be well served by competition in the specific case.' 13 Legally,
therefore, health system planner-regulators may be authorized to allow competition
to operate only where an affirmative justification, supported by evidence, is given.
Although Congress might be well advised to repeal the health planning legislation
as part of a broader strategy for letting market forces take over, 114 as things now
stand, this is not an option that the regulators may adopt themselves. The evidence
necessary to support a policy of instantaneous and total deregulation of all services
is probably not yet available in any market." 5
Far from leaning toward the radical laissez-faire approach, most health system
planner-regulators will tend toward conservatism and resist accepting any responsi-
bility at all for fostering competition. Although they may acknowledge a duty
recognize competition whenever and wherever it becomes a potent and construc-
tive force, most of them will regard that event as so unlikely to occur that it can be
dismissed for practical regulatory purposes. This assessment of competition's pros-
pects is partly an outgrowth of health planners' training and ideology and partly a
result of political pressures and the planners' need to obtain the cooperation of
existing providers. The planner-regulators will not perceive the highly conservative
nature of their position because the possibilities of fundamental change will have
escaped their notice. Moreover, in doing battle with established interests on minor
incremental issues, they will not realize the extent to which they have adopted their
111. See note 15, supra.
112. For an overview of a more complete strategy for promoting competition, see C. Havighurst,
Increasing Competition in Health Services, March 28, 1980 (prepared for a conference on National
Health Policy held at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, California). See also A. ENI-HOVEN, supra note
27, at 114-56.
113. See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 771 (1974).
114. At least one of the procompetitive proposals for national health insurance would repeal the
planning law outright. H.R. 1010, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
115. Although the reports of vigorous competition in Minneapolis-St. Paul are encouraging (see
Christianson & McClure, supra note 29), instantaneous and total deregulation may not be justified even
there.
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antagonists' assumptions concerning the rate and nature of contemplatable change
and have allied themselves with those with whom they share power. 1 6 It is
noteworthy that planners and providers share many similar views on the efficacy of
competition and the desirability of its encouragement.
A slightly more market-oriented approach that planners might adopt also lies
toward the more conservative end of the scale. It would involve undertaking a
careful and open-minded evaluation of the nine factors itemized above and of the
effectiveness of existing price and utilization controls in private financing plans and
would employ a competitive strategy only where market forces and such controls
were found to be working well. The trouble with this strategy is that it accepts the
market as it finds it and neglects even the most immediate and realistic possibilities
for change. More seriously, it implies that the financing system is, at any point in
time, doing all that it can reasonably be expected to do and that further cost
containment is the regulators' sole responsibility. This approach would tend to
freeze dysfunctional reimbursement practices in place, an effect that would be
compounded if regulation were really effective in moderating costs. Thus, to the
extent that regulation successfully protected existing financing plans from the
consequences of their own inefficiency, it would ipso facto reduce both traditional
plans' incentive to change and the market opportunities of alternative delivery
systems. For these reasons, the regulatory attitude that looks only at the financing
system as it is currently performing may be viewed as precisely the problem that
must be overcome. Given significant possibilities for competitive evolution in the
financing system, regulation must be implemented in such a way that it serves as a
catalyst of change, not as the private sector's best excuse for not changing.
Unfortunately, it is simply not possible for the planner-regulators to be neutral
on the private sector's future cost-containment capability. While it would undoubt-
edly be easier for them to say that they will recognize that capability when and if it
appears, current decisions that are based on the assumption that the prevailing
market failure is irremediable, or on the assumption that it can be cured without
the planners' participation, could easily seal the fate of private sector change. On
the other hand, a willingness to leave some things to market forces today would
strengthen those forces and permit them to assume an increasingly substantial role
in the future. Thus, because whatever prophecy is implicit in the regulators' basic
approach could easily be self-fulfilling, the planner-regulators, unless they choose
to be part of a market-oriented solution, could themselves be part of the market
failure that is the ultimate problem. The ensuing analysis seeks to help the
planner-regulators carry out their regulatory responsibilities in such a way as to
promote rather than suppress competition's emergence. It would seem that they
have been explicitly charged by Congress with a duty to approach matters in these
terms.
B. The Strategy of Anticipating and Encouraging Change
Fortunately, a moderate approach, seeking fundamental change under regulatory
supervision, is available to the health care system's planner-regulators. The proposed
116. Havighurst, supra note 9. a( 1178-88 and 1194-97.
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strategy, foreshadowed in earlier discussion of the financing system's poten-
tial for change, involves anticipating what the market can effectively do and
withholding regulation that inhibits the market's adaptation. While this strategy is
certainly the most difficult to employ for both political and technical reasons, its
rewards are potentially great.
In assessing the possibilities for such demand-side reforms as competitively
inspired controls over the price and utilization of services, planner-regulators
should not attach undue weight to conventional assessments or to the predictions
of those with a stake in keeping financing arrangements as nearly as possible in
their present form. Most providers, most insurance carriers, most administrators of
public programs, and even most established HMOs are not likely to be receptive to
significant additional changes in financing and delivery arrangements. At best,
these interests appear to favor gradual, incremental changes, presided over by
regulators with whom they can negotiate the pace of change and the details. By
their very nature, competitively inspired developments, in addition to lacking the
by-your-leave character of most regulation-sponsored change, are to some extent
unpredictable and sudden, and they are thus intensely threatening to established
industry interests. For these reasons, competition lacks a political constituency and
able advocates within the industry and is systematically deemphasized as a possibil-
ity in the conventional wisdom. 117 Although their political makeup and environ-
ment will make their efforts on behalf of competition difficult, the HSAs and state
certificate-of-need agencies have an important role to play in keeping this promis-
ing idea alive and giving it a chance to show what it can do.
The argument here is that the private financing system's potential for change
must be a central factor in every regulatory decision on whether to impose the
regulators' own quantitative standards in controlling entry or, alternatively, to let
market forces regulate entry, location, and survival. Perhaps the most significant
fact about the health services marketplace today is that the private sector's capacity
to introduce innovative cost-containment measures is increasing steadily. Wider
availability of HMOs, greater cost-consciousness on the part of employers and
unions, active antitrust enforcement against provider-imposed restraints that have
inhibited change in the past, and emerging legislative interest in increasing con-
sumers' opportunities to economize in the purchase of a health care plan all point
toward a dynamic potential that planner-regulators can help to foster-and should
certainly not ignore-in their regulatory activities. As the financing system begins,
at long last, to respond to consumers' cost concerns, supply-side regulation must
adjust to allow market forces to operate where they have previously failed to do so.
Further, as the planner-regulators recognize the potential for competitive responses
even where they have not yet occurred, they have a responsibility not to stand in
the way of such developments.
The recommended regulatory stance should be assumed not as a rigid position,
but as a part of a broad and constructive planning strategy designed to effectuate
117. Cf. Enthoven, Does Anyone Want Competition? The Politics of National Health Insurance, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH CARE 238-50 (C. Lindsay ed. 1980).
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the new national health priority of strengthening useful competition and HSAs'
newly assigned function of "improving . . . competition in the health service
area."' 118 Thus, where the planner-regulators take the view that the price and
utilization of a particular service can be better controlled in the private sector than
through entry regulation, they might also find it appropriate to preside over the
transition from public to private control in order both to stimulate the process of
change and to assist affected parties in adjusting to it. For example, rather than
simply opening up the market for such a service, they might announce their
intention to do so at some future date-thus, the health systems plan might
declare, "In two years, anyone can have a CAT scanner." Then the planners could
actively assist employment groups, insurers, PSROs, and the rest of the community
to prepare for that day, when effective price and utilization controls could be
embodied in fee schedules and in coverage limitations in the insurance contract
and implemented through provider participation agreements.
In pursuing a strategy for bringing about needed change, the planner-regulators
could give their attention to overcoming a problem likely to be encountered in
obtaining wider use of participation agreements by indemnity insurers-namely,
providers' recalcitrance in accepting contractual limitations on their fees or on their
right to payment for unauthorized services. If not the result of an actionable
restraint of trade, 1 19 such resistance to competition might best be met by the
planners' announcing their willingness to allow new entry by any new provider who
had firm agreements embodying price and utilization understandings with third
parties. Such a tactic should give third parties, who could threaten to exclude
providers without such contracts from eligibility to provide covered services, the
bargaining power necessary to bring providers to terms. The dynamic at work here
is the same one that supports allowing substantial HMOs to build their own
hospitals without regulatory restraint. The new exemption for HMOs from
certificate-of-need requirements 120 strengthens greatly their ability to bargain effectively
with existing institutions.' 2 1 The crucial message is that planners who come to
appreciate the dynamics of competition should be able, if they are willing, to force
providers to accept competition against their will.
Without health planners' active intercession in support of financing system
change, the prospect for innovation by third-party payers may be considerably
diminished. Even though it may be obvious that insurers could take effective
measures that consumers would value, there may not be an adequate incentive for
any single private insurer to take the needed first step. No innovation is without
118. Planning Amendments of 1979 § 103(c) [amending §1513(a) of the Public Health Service Act].
119. In Am. Med. Ass'n., No. 9064 (FTC, Oct. 12, 1979), the FTC ruled that the medical
profession's ethical proscriptions against "contract practice" violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1)(1976). Nevertheless, antipathy to such arrangements is deeply
ingrained in many physicians and can be expected to endure.
120. Planning Amendments of 1979 § 117(a) [adding § 1527(b) to the Public Health Service Act].
121. The new ability of certain HMOs to build a hospital without regulatory approval threatens
existing facilities with competition that previously they could count on being suppressed. The
competitive pressure should induce them to sell or lease to. or contract with, the HMO. Paradoxically,
the exemption for HMOs should lead to little new construction, but better use of existing facilities.
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risk, and this kind may incur the wrath of organized medicine. Moreover, it will
certainly entail some costs in negotiating with providers, in selling the innovative
plan to employment groups, and in introducing new administrative procedures.
Finally, the benefits of the innovation may accrue to others besides the innovator
and his customers. Thus, for example, it might have spillover effects on medical
practice generally, changing doctors' approach to treating all their patients and not
just those insured by the innovating insurer. Alternatively, other insurers might
find it relatively easy to imitate any innovations that proved effective, leaving the
innovative firm to bear the costs of unsuccessful ventures without much hope of
gaining a competitive advantage from a successful one. All of these possibilities
may make it unrealistic to expect competition alone, unaided by the health
planners, to bring about some desirable and highly beneficial innovations. 122
Where insurers seem unable to capture a distinct comirpetitixe advantage fron
introducing certain cost-containment innovations, the planner-regulators, rather
than seizing on the apparent market failure as an excuse fOr command-and-control
regulation, might take strategic actions of a nonregulatory kind. Directly addressing
the market failure itself, they might attempt to trigger the process of change that
the unassisted market was unable to get started. For example, their intervention
might take the form of actively assisting the marketing efftrts of any insurer that
seeks to alter its payment methods-in effect, subsidizing the insurer by reducing
his costs and risks in innovating. Another alternative would be for the planner-
regulators to cooperate with several insurers and the state insurance comm issioner
in simultaneously redesigning the insurers' coverage and approaches to claims
review. Any collective action by competing insurers that might be involved, if done
under supervision and properly confined to overcoming the identified market
failure, should not offend antitrust principles. '- : Given the arguable market deter-
rent to individual insurers' initiatives, these market-assisting approaches might be
more constructive than direct regulation of sulpply.
Even where a local market appears hopelessly noncompetitive and private cost
containment is not immediately in prospect, permanent regulatory control of entry
might still not be the appropriate remedy. Because competition may still be the
best long run hope and because nonprice competition could contribute significantly
in the short run to quality and efficiency in local markets for health services, the
planner-regulators might choose to encourage competition while addressing fun-
damental market conditions that may in time stimulate the private sector to develop
mechanisms for handling the cost problem. Competitiveness is determined by such
supply-side factors as: the number of sellers; the availability of information;
122. See M. PAULY, supra note 77.
123. This point is not clear, however. Under National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978), the test is whether concerted action "promotes" competition. Under this
principle, efforts to overcome a market deficiency such as the free-rider problems identified here may
be permissible so long as the effect is to make the market work better and not to prevent its working.
The FTC, though declaring ethical prohibitions against advertising and solicitation unlawful, has
allowed professional groups to continue to prohibit and police "false and deceptive" advertising,
presumably on the ground that consumer ignorance and gullibility is a market failure whose correction
by concerted action will make market forces more reliable. Am. Med. Ass'n. No. 9064 (F.T.C., Oct. 12,
1979), at 58-60.
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the existence or absence of collusion; the interchangeability of services and the
availability of substitutes for particular services; opportunities for granting
hidden price or other concessions as competitive moves that are difficult for
competitors to discover and imitate; and private actors' Freedom to innovate
without fear of sanctions imposed collectively by competitors or others. Where
competition has traditionally been weak, it may not be inevitably so, and planner-
regulators at the local level might seek to trigger competition by taking nonregulatory
steps to encourage aggressive negotiating by insurers (or employers or unions) and
to break up collusive practices. They might also stimulate advertising and other
forms of information dissemination, such as better disclosure of which providers
would "accept assignment" -that is, accept various financing plans' fee schedules
or other allowances as payment in full. There are many reasons to think that HSAs
and their planning staffs might provide the greatest service to their communities
by stimulating price and other forms of competition, by educating consumers and
employers to private cost-containment possibilities, and by strengthening those forces
that are most capable of offsetting providers' market power and giving effect to
consumers' concerns about cost.
Ultimately, planner-regulators might be inclined to lift all entry controls on the
basis of the simple availability in the community of a significant number of
competitive health care plans with developed cost-containment capability. Once
such plans exist in sufficient numbers to give the consumer meaningful options, it
should seem appropriate to let the market strategy work. The lifting of controls in
such a competitive environment should further strengthen consumers' incentives to
join an innovative plan, entrepreneurs' incentives to organize more such plans, and
providers' incentives to participate in them. If Medicare beneficiaries have the
means, under new legislation, of enrolling in an HMO (or in any other type of
competitive health care plan) and benefitting themselves from any resulting sav-
ing,' 2 4 there would no longer be any convincing reason to protect the Medicare
program or those beneficiaries who elect not to switch. The planner-regulators
would simply have to judge what was a meaningful range of choice, whether
competition, both among plans and among providers for the chance to serve the
subscribers of such plans, was truly vigorous, and whether the plans would be
capable of accepting increased enrollment if costs in the deregulated private sector
should rise. If conditions are right, however, deregulation should cause no significantly
increased costs, because would-be certificate-of-need applicants (and their lenders)
would be deterred from making inappropriate investments by their recognition of
the risks that newly effective market forces have created.
VI
OBSTACLES 1O DEREGULI.ATION IN H.t.\i SAl. I--IS
The idea of moving toward greater reliance on competitively inspired private
sector cost controls in the health services industry is an attractive one in many
124. Under H.R. 4000 and S. 1530, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), a Medicare beneficiary would have
the option of enrolling at federal expense in a qualified HMO in lieu of having his or her benefits paid
out on a fee-for-service basis. HMOs would compete for enrollments by using any gains from superior
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respects, but it is far from being a simple matter. Not only will many planner-
regulators instinctively distrust competition both ideologically and as a threat to
their power and prerogatives, but there are severe practical problems in reordering
incentives, removing restraints on private initiatives, and restoring competitive
instincts long suppressed. Moreover, deregulation must confront two major fea-
tures of the health services industry that are largely dependent on the continuation
of regulation. Both relate to the ways in which society has chosen to finance
services for those unable to pay for them.
A. The Relevance of Federal Programs' Comparative Inflexibility
Given recent alterations in the climate for privately initiated change, the
private sector's adaptability to deal with artificially induced demand for services
and with the higher prices that insurance encourages may be substantially greater
than that of public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. These programs are
fixed in law and custom, are unwieldy in size, reflect bureaucratic inertia, and
embody a political and social consensus that limits their ability to respond readily to
changes in the economic environment. The issue thus arises whether health system
planner-regulators must adopt attitudes toward competition that accommodate only
the specific needs of federal programs. If regulation were thus geared to the lowest
common denominator-the system's least flexible parts-the prospects fir meaning-
ful change and reduced dependence on regulation wotld be greatly diminished. If,
on the other hand, the regulators should pursue procompetitive policies in con-
templation of significant private sector change, the federal programs, being less
adaptable in the short run, may incur some higher costs. Something of a dilemma
is thus presented.
The mandate of the planner-regulators extends to the health caie system as a
whole, and it would not seem appropriate for them to confine themselves to acting
in the interests solely of the Medicare and Medicaid progianms if that meant
inhibiting reforms beneficial to consumers in the private sector. Of course, DHHS
may not encourage health planning and regulators to take a long run, system-wide
view. 12 5 Nevertheless, the Department's stance should not be determinative. Its per-
ceptions are greatly influenced by its fiscal concerns as steward of Medicare and
Medicaid funds and by the cost-reimbursement dogma incorporated in these huge
programs. Congress, on the other hand, in enacting the planning law and its amend-
ments, has revealed wide concerns and has now squarely endorsed the concept of
procompetitive change in the private sector. It would seem that this is the cue that
health system planners and regulators should take. Admittedly, HSAs may find it
difficult to ignore the preferences and regulatory philosophy of DHHS, to which
efficiency to reduce Medicare cost sharing for the beneficiary or to expand his or her benefits.
125. The final regulations implementing the 1979 amendments are not without promise, however.
They seem to suggest that DHHS will show considerable deference to state and local judgments on the
desirability of competition and will not pressure state and local agencies to protect Medicare and
Medicaid. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,771 (1980).
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they are accountable in many respects. But the federal statute, the state certificate-of-
need law, and the state agency are all superior authorities, and one should expect
that responsible policies will not be frustrated.
It is also probable that strengthened competition it the privaite sector will prove
to be in the long run interest of the federal government's programs. Those
programs have many mechanisms within them that would allow them to derive
indirect benefits from positive developments in private sector cost containment.
Thus, if "usual and customary" fees are kept down thtrough strengthened competi-
tion, public programs and their beneficiaries would benefit. Further. any increased
institutional efficiency that is brought about by competition should show Up in due
course in Medicare cost reports. And changes in utilization patterns in treating
private patients should ultimately be reflected both in medical practice generally
and in PSRO norms that limit the exposure of federal prograims. Current ps-
als to allow Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in HN()s at reduced
expense to the federal government demonstrate another way in which private
sector developments can accrue to the advantage of federal programs.
Private sector reforms, both by showing the way, and by reshaping the industry
along more cost-effective lines, would almost certainly contribute more to funda-
mental change in public programs than anything that Congress or I)HHS can
reasonably be expected to do bv legislation or regulation. Even if' Medicare and
Medicaid do encounter some higher costs under freer competition, that effect
should simply induce Congress and the states to break finally with the cost-
reimbursement approach in those programs and to move to more responsible
payment methods. Moreover. if competition (toes take hold in the private sector,
government would be more likely to resist the temptation to control costs bv
becoming a dictatorial monopsonist, demanding adherence to its fee schedules and
"reasonable cost" determinations and otherwise exerting its buy ing power over
providers. With competition working, the government could more readily move
toward a voucher-type system in which consumers with subsidized purchasing
power and incentives to economize Would guide the system. Government could
thus build on, rather than undercut, the private sector s strengths. In the last
analysis, encouragement of private sector changes is prob)ably the shortest route to
realiable cost containment, which appears more and more to be a prerequisite [or
enacting some form of universal health insurance.
B. Weighing the Arguments for Protectionist Regulation
The protectionist tendencies of all economic regulation have appeared strongly
in the administration of certificate-of-need laws."'' Among the planner-regulators'
articles of faith is the belief that excess capital tacilities will be put to inappropriate
uses for which the financing system, lacking the capacity to distinguish inapprolpri-
ate utilization, will pay. Another unexamined priemise is that capital investments.
once made, will almost certainly be charged off to the public over time, along with
126. See Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Health Planners. 1978 Ui-AH L. Rru'. 123,
140-46; see also Havighurst supra note 9, at 1178-88 and 1204-15.
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the attendant operating costs, through third-party payment systems dedicated to
reimbursing either providers' incurred costs or insureds' incurred charges. As we
have seen, however, regulation should no longer proceed on the assumption that
cost-reimbursement techniques, widely employed in the past, will continue in the
future. Thus, a major justification for preventing competitively induced change
must be rejected.
A further justification that may be offered for protectionist policies in
certification-of-need retains substantially more validity. This justification is the
frequently perceived need to protect revenues that enable an existing provider to
provide some service which the planner-regulators deem desirable, but which
cannot support itself. Such "internal subsidization," which has been a common
feature of all regulated industries, is common in hospitals, which price their
services without strict regard to costs. 127 This practice exposes the hospital to the
threat of competition from a new provider of the overpriced services and accounts
for the common claim that a new entrant is "skimming the cream" and leaving the
existing hospital with the burden of providing needed but unprofitable services.
Faced with such a claim, health system planner-regulators must make some diffi-
cult judgments concerning not only the short run and long run benefits of
competition as an allocative mechanism, but also some other possibly important
values.
It has been argued that hospitals, particularly nonprofit hospitals, employ
internal subsidization to "compensat[e] for distortions and inequities in existing
health insurance coverage." 128 As a general proposition, this is indisputable, but it
raises many questions. If a gap exists in insurance coverage, one must inquire
about the gap's origin before judging that it is one that should be filled through an
internal subsidy. For example, if consumers selected insurance plans that would
not pay for experimental treatments, the hospital should not be permitted to
subsidize those treatments by billing more for insured services; such a subsidy
would amount to a rewriting of private insurance contracts and would violate the
principle of consumer choice. Moreover, it would seem much sounder for the
hospital to seek explicit subsidies for its experimental work. Similarly, educational
costs should be isolated by making cost differences between teaching and nonteaching
institutions more visible in a competitive market. Private insurance plans, reflecting
consumer choice, can serve as efficient resource allocation mechanisms only if their
exclusions from, and dollar limits on, coverage are respected and not cancelled out
by protected provider monopolies milking the insurance system in order to indulge
preferences of their own. Competitive entry eroding the spending discretion of
monopolistic hospitals would contribute greatly to the emergence of consumer
preferences as the dominant force controlling the performance of the hospital
sector. It would also make it necessary for those desiring public subsidies to
compete for the available public funds by applying to the government.
127. Harris, Pricing Rules for Hospitals, 10 BELL J. EcON. 224 (1979).
128. Id. at 225.
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Probably the only internal subsidies that should be deemed to justify exclusionary
regulation are those that benefit low-income patients. Despite the failure to enact a
broad program of national health insurance, society has long recognized a com-
mitment to meet the needs of patients lacking the means to purchase adequate
health insurance. Hospitals have long filled a critical role in meeting this social
commitment, and, in the absence of an adequate federal program, their capacity to
carry on this role probably needs to be protected in some measure. By the same
token, enactment of national health insurance in some form should be deemed,
when it occurs, to reduce, if not to eliminate altogether, the need to foster the
hospital as a monopolistic charity. But, in the short run, the health care system's
planner-regulators may legitimately exclude competition as a means of preserving
an existing hospital's ability to meet the vital needs of underserved and underin-
sured populations.
The regulatory problem here is substantial for several reasons. The existence
and extent of subsidies are extremely hard to establish, particularly in the absence
of uniform cost-accounting techniques. In addition, a hospital faced with competition
from a certificate-of-need applicant would always threaten to close the service that
the planner-regulators value most highly, even if many other services were also
beneficiaries of the subsidy in jeopardy. The proper regulatory stance in such a
case is to impose a heavy burden of proof on the hospital seeking protection from
competition. 29 Not only would its cost accounting have to be convincing and
complete, but it should have to demonstrate that other, less defensible, subsidies
did not exist. Because DHHS's latest certificate-of- need regulations require that a
hospital obtain a "certificate of need" to close an existing service'. 1 ' the hospital is
no longer entirely free to choose which service it will eliminate when confronted
with competition. Given that power, state regulators should not let a hospital hold
a service provided to low-income patients as a hostage to get protection for its
internal subsidization capability. Unless the hospital can show, with reasonable
clarity, that it has no alternative candidates for closure, it should be denied the
protected market position it seeks.
There are some indications that internal subsidies and the protectionism re-
quired to maintain them are not favored in the law. The 1979 health planning
amendments, by exempting HMOs from certificate-of-need requirements, revealed
an unwillingness to trust the regulators to evaluate a procompetitive entrant against
existing providers' claims. Although the amendments expanded the statutory
criteria to allow consideration of a construction project's effects "on the costs and
charges to the public of providing health services by other persons," ''" : this
129. Cf. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARxV. L. Rv. 1416, 1480-84
(1980).
130. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,740, 69,746-47 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 123,404). Serious questions can be
raised, however, about whether this requirement is contemplated by or consistent with the statute,
Congress did not reveal an intention to extend regulatory authority to cutbacks as well as expansions of
service.
131. Planning Amendments of 1979 §11 6 (g)(l) [amending §1532(c)(9)(B) of the Public Health
Service Act].
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provision does not amount to a blanket acceptance of internal subsidies or an
excuse for exclusionary regulation. Indeed, Congress has revealed a distinct dissat-
isfaction with internal subsidies in other provisions of the health planning law.
Although these provisions are arguably inconsistent with the mandatory internal
subsidies that DHHS has enforced against hospitals that have received Hill-Burton
assistance in the past,' 3 2 those requirements may be rationalized as a way of
assuring that past federal subsidies are applied as intended. In general, Congress
would seem to have raised competition to a level where only a compelling need for
subsidy should be deemed to outweigh it as a value.
Given the propensity of regulators to give in to protectionist temptations,
DHHS regulations and state certificate-of-need laws should probably undertake to
limit their discretion in this area. A potentially useful approach appears in the
innovative Utah certificate-of-need law, which requires a finding that "the overrid-
ing public interest" would be affected by a subsidy's elimination as well as an
estimate of the hidden cost incurred.'13 3 This approach implies an appropriate
presumption against cross-subsidies and an insistence on visibility and justification.
CONCLUSION
The 1979 health planning amendments restore appropriate balance to the
nation's health policy by putting Congress on record for the first time in favor of
relying on competition to allocate resources to and within the health care sector of
the economy wherever it can serve Congressionally declared goals. The door to
ultimate deregulation has thus been opened, and this article has attempted to show
the path that the health system's planners and regulators are now invited to follow.
Congress has revealed that its continued support for health planning and regula-
tion does not imply that it automatically accepts the use of command-and-control
methods throughout the length and breadth of the regulators' jurisdiction. Instead,
Congress expects health planning and regulation to incorporate a preference for
using and strengthening market mechanisms wherever that is a responsible policy.
By embodying a presumption in favor of competition wherever an irredeemable
market failure is not involved, health policy has now become consistent with
emerging deregulation strategies in other regulated industries.
In concluding this discussion of the planner-regulators' new statutory mandate
and how it might be carried out, it must be observed that we have left unexplored
a vital, yet highly debatable proposition, namely, that there is a close correlation
between legal mandates and regulatory performance. Realism compels recognition
at this point of the possibility that it may take more than an act of Congress to
change the behavior of health system planners and regulators. Even though the
1979 amendments are quite clear in embracing competition as an alternative tool
for identifying and giving effect to the public interest, they necessarily leave a great
deal to the planners' and regulators' judgment. Given the degree of subjectivity
132. See 42 C.F.R. § 124,501-52 (1979).
133. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-11(l)(f) (1979 Supp.).
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involved in deciding whether competition and consumer choice can serve public
objectives well, the new legal mandate probably cannot be enforced in a way to
deprive the planner-regulators of wide discretion in deciding how much competi-
tion should be allowed and whether to anticipate and foster the emergence of
more reliable market forces. Experience in other industries has frequently revealed
the resourcefulness of agencies in clinging to old ways in the face of new statutory
directives. 134 Because health planners and regulators, as a class, are probably even
more resistant than other regulators to the idea that competition and consumer
choice can be constructive influences in their industry, it may seem harder to
harbor high hopes that a meaningful deregulation movement has, in fact, been
launched by the 1979 amendments.
Despite the difficulty of changing deep-seated values and perceptions by a
statutory amendment, it is still possible to sketch a plausible scenario culminating in
something similar to total deregulation of the health services industry. The essen-
tial hopeful fact is that health planning and regulation is highly decentralized,
being carried out by more than 200 HSAs, by state agencies, and SHCCs in every
state. Although planners and regulators are unlikely to be converted en masse to
the cause of promoting competition, the possibility must be acknowledged that a
significant minority of these planning and regulatory bodies will, either by design
or default, give effect to the new mandate." 5 By tolerating and even encouraging
vigorous competition and fostering financing reforms, these agencies might lay the
groundwork for changes that would spread to other areas. Through the deregulation
of particular services in particular markets and through nonregulatory initiatives,
market-oriented health planning and innovative regulation could yield valuable
regulatory experience and foster innovations in private cost containment that are
transferable to other markets. Thus, the deregulation movement might benefit
from persuasive natural experiments, much as airline deregulation was helped
along by the superior performance of unregulated intra-state carriers in California
and Texas.' 
3 6
The other development lending hopefulness to the deregulation scenario is a
political climate increasingly receptive to market-oriented strategies and increasing-
ly unsupportive of traditional forms of regulation and planning. This deregulatory
134. An often cited example of an agency resisting a change in its statutory mandate was the ICC's
reluctance to permit vigorous price competition between railroads and other modes of transportation,
even after Congress amended the ICC's statutory authority in an apparent effort to encourage
intermodal competition. See, e.g., ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 744 (1963)
(overturning an ICC decision limiting intermodal price competition): Amer. Commercial Lines v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968) (upholding an ICC decision limiting intermodal price
competition). For a description of the leading cases and legislative history, see JONES, REGULATED
INDUSTRIES 656-716 (2d ed. 1976). It is noteworthy, however, that the ICC's mandate to promote
intermodal competition was less clear than the health planners' and regulators' new mandate to promote
competition in the health care sector.
135. Utah, for example, has already indicated that it will be receptive to the new procompetitive
policy adopted by Congress. In fact, Utah's Procompetitive Certificate of Need Act of 1979 predated the
1979 federal planning amendments.
136. See, e.g., Is Regulation Necessa,? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy, 74
YALE L. J. 1416 (1965); W. JORDAN, AIR REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFCTS & IMPERFECI'IONS (1970).
HEALTIH PLIANNING;
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
climate could easily prove decisive in the health care sector just as it has in other
regulated industries. 137 Like the Civil Aeronautics Board, which under Alfred
Kahn's chairmanship took the lead in deregulating the airlines, health system
planner-regulators may sense that the wind is blowing strongly in the direction of
the market strategy and may chart their course so that the wind is at their backs,
not in their faces. Indeed, recent cuts in HSA budgets'3 8 may presage an anti-
planning gale that will induce the agencies to abandon their foundering
command-and-control flagship for a new, more seaworthy vessel-the Competition
Bandwagon.
The key question, then, is not so much what the 1979 health planning
amendments say as whether they signify that a definitive political choice has been,
or is in the process of being, made. The thesis here is that Congress has been
uncharacteristically forthright and definitive in stating its preference in the new
amendments. Morever, its choice seems likely to stick, both because it is technically
sound and because it enjoys political support as a promising middle ground
between heavy-handed regulation and the unsatisfactory status quo. If this assess-
ment is accurate, many planners and state regulators can be expected to accept
Congress' procompetitive choice. Not only may their own political future depend,
ironically, upon their accepting the deregulatory mission, but many of them may
learn to view introducing competition as both a worthy challenge and a promising
strategy for achieving substantive reforms. And, indeed, the competition strategy
does seem a better way to bring about needed change than the perpetual political
infighting and regulatory naysaying that have hitherto characterized health plan-
ning and certification-of-need.
137. See. e.g., Sarasohn, Trucking Deregulation Plans Progress, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 581 (1980)
(suggesting that President Carter's support for trucking deregulation would have resulted in substantial
deregulation by administrative decision even if Congress had not passed a deregulation bill); Sarasohn,
FCC Acts to Deregulate Telecommunications, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 933 (1980) (describing FCC steps to
deregulate telecommunications); Kelleher, Deregulation and the Practicing Attorney, 44 J. AIR L. & COM.
261, 280-81 (1978) (describing CAB steps to deregulate air fares prior to the 1978 deregulation act but
after deregulation had gained political credibility).
138. The federal appropriation for HSAs was 20 percent lower in fiscal year 1981 than it was in
fiscal year 1980. Rorrie Tells Planners to Limit Their Objectives, HEALTH PLANNING & MANPOWER REPORT 5
(Jan. 14, 1981).
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